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ONLINE PRIVACY & THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
AN OPT-IN APPROACH TO DATA PROCESSING
Joseph A. Tomain*
An individual has little to no ability to prevent online commercial actors
from collecting, using, or disclosing data about her. This lack of
individual choice is problematic in the Big Data era because individual
privacy interests are threatened by the ever increasing number of actors
processing data, as well as the ever increasing amount and types of data
being processed. This Article argues that online commercial actors
should be required to receive an individual's opt-in consent prior to
data processing as a way of protecting individual privacy. I analyze
whether an opt-in requirement is constitutionally permissible under the
First Amendment and conclude that an opt-in requirement is fully
consistent with the First Amendment rights of data processors.
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"The capacity of technology to find and publish personal
information.., presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to
personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure. - Justice Anthony
Kennedy
I. INTRODUCTION
People have become the product.2 Online commercial actors collect,
use, and disclose data about individuals for financial gain, often
1. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
2. Julia Angwin, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2014, at A23 ("if
you aren't paying for the product, you are the product") (emphasis in original); Ryan Calo, Digital
Market Manipulation, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 995, 1047 (2014) (suggesting that through law or best
practices individuals could pay a fee to opt-out of the "marketing ecosystem" and that "such an
arrangement could reorient the consumer from being a product to being a client."). See also Alexander
Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite Retention of Data, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 433, 434 (2014) ("Once divulged on the Internet, private facts about persons'
preferences, aversions, job and shopping patterns, and plans are commodifiable at the initiative of profit
seeking corporations with sophisticated business models designed to convert mundane and intimate
data, alike, into marketing strategies."); In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 WL 6248499, *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (describing Google's advertising business model as one where "the users are
the real product."); Erin Bernstein & Theresa J. Lee, Where the Consumer is the Commodity: The
Difficulty with the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. 39, 40-41 (2013);
Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1246-48 (2002) ("Really astute cyberlords, however, can accomplish even
more by turning their users' personalities into sources of revenue .... Like feudal serfs, 'cyberserfs'
live 'cyberlives' managed by their lord for the lord's financial gain. As such, the cyberserf becomes an
asset owned by the cyberlord's business."). Some commenters, however, take issue with a similar
metaphor. See, e.g., Mike Mansick, Stop Saying 'If You're Not Paying, You're the Product, TECHD1RT,
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121219/18272921446/stop-saying-if-youre-not-
paying-youre-product.shtml. While similar to "people have become the product," the metaphor
Mansick critiques is materially different. One becomes the product through the aggregation of data and
the creation of detailed profiles, regardless of whether one pays for an online service.
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resulting in detailed profiles of millions of individuals. Through online
behavioral advertising, 3 these profiles are used to sell products and
services to the individuals themselves, their friends and family, and
others with similar profiles.4 Sometimes, these profiles are used to deny
individuals access to products, services or employment, or to charge
higher prices.5 Profiling individuals and data collection occurred prior
to the digital age. 6  What makes online data processing and behavioral
advertising unique, however, is the exponential increase in the amount
and types of data collected, and the number of actors engaged in such
commercial activities, mostly without the consent of individuals whose
data is being processed.7 There is no end in sight to the proliferation of
data processing and the number of actors involved, or to the
development of increasingly intrusive and opaque techniques used to
gather more and more data.8 The Big Data era is just beginning. 9
Currently, individuals have little to no choice in being commodified
for firms' financial gain or preventing the concomitant privacy invasions
that profiling entails. These privacy invasions by Big Data actors, such
as Google, Facebook, and Acxiom, harm individuals' dignity and
3. Online behavioral advertising involves the long term tracking of an individual's online
activity to create a detailed profile about the individual for purposes of making decisions about what
kind of advertisement to display to the individual. See infra Part I1.
4. JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY Is DEFINING
YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 94, 147-48 (2011) (noting that online behavioral advertising is used
not only to target the individual, but also the individual's friends); Emily Steel, Marketers Watch as
Friends Interact Online, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304159304575184270077115444 ("in the
Internet age, a customer's friend is a potential customer.") [hereinafter TUROW, THE DAILY YOU].
5. Michael Fertik, The Rich See a Different Internet to the Poor, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Feb.
18, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfn?id=rich-see-different-intemet-than-the-poor;
Pam Dixon & Robert Gellman, The Scoring of America: How Secret Consumer Sores Threaten Your
Privacy and Your Future, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of AmericaApril2014_fs.pdf.
6. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives]; Natasha Singer, Mapping, and
Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at BU1.
7. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 6, at 1374.
8. For example, cookies are being replaced by fingerprinting, a more sophisticated and more
intrusive tracking technique. Fingerprinting "allows a web site to look at the characteristics of a
computer such as what plugins and software you have installed, the size of the screen, the time zone,
fonts and other features of any particular machine. These form a unique signature just like random skin
patterns on a finger." Adam Tanner, The Web Cookies is Dying. The Creepier Technology That Comes
Next, FORBES (June 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/06/17/the-web-cookie-is-
dying-heres-the-creepier-technology-that-comes-next/.
9. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 103, 156 (2013) (noting
that the use of Big Data is not yet commonplace); TUROW, THE DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at I ("We're
at the start of a revolution in the ways marketers and media intrude in-and shape--our lives.").
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autonomy interests.' 0 They also harm the collective good and the
democratic process.'
In the context of online commercial data processing generally, with a
particular focus on online behavioral advertising as one example of data
processing, this Article seeks to help restore the proper balance between
competing interests. On the one hand are considerations of individual
privacy, autonomy, dignity, and democratic participation interests. On
the other hand are the financial interests of private firms. This Article
contends that an opt-in regime, which would require online commercial
actors to receive an individual's express, affirmative and informed
consent before engaging in data processing, is a necessary part of the
solution to help restore that balance. For example, before Google uses
the content of an individual's email for purposes beyond sending the
email to the intended recipient, Google must first receive the sender's
opt-in consent for secondary uses, such as using the content of the email
to target advertising at the individual or create a profile about her.
12
Part II explains why online data processing by commercial actors is
an example of cyberspace exceptionalism. Part III provides context on
privacy interests and theories relevant to data processing, and shows
how a law and economics analysis supports regulation of online data
processing. Part IV discusses existing and proposed opt-in laws and
policy in the online privacy context, including Federal Trade
Commission reports and actions, White House reports, and the European
Union's recently proposed General Data Protection Regulation.
Part V, the heart of this Article, analyzes the constitutionality of an
opt-in requirement. Specifically, it analyzes the viability of an opt-in
10. See TUROW, THE DAILY You, supra note 4, at 7 ("[W]hen companies track people without
their knowledge, sell their data without letting them know what they are doing or securing their
permission, and then use those data to decide which of those people are targets or waste, we have a
serious social problem."); OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, infra note
16, at 10 ("Some of the most profound challenges revealed during this review concern how big data
analytics may lead to disparate inequitable treatment, particularly of disadvantaged groups, or create
such an opaque decisions-making environment that individual autonomy is lost in an impenetrable set of
algorithms.").
11. Julie Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013) ("freedom from
surveillance, whether public or private, is foundational to the practice of informed and reflective
citizenship. Privacy therefore is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political
systems."); Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1610-18
(1999) ("cyberspace has a tremendous potential to revitalize democratic self-governance... [but] [i]n
the absence of strong privacy rules, cyberspaces civic potential will never be attained.").
12. Jerry Kang used the phrase "functionally necessary use" to describe limiting the use of data
to the underlying purpose of the transaction. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy In Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1249 (1998). Mayer-Schoneberger and Cukier, however, believe
that limiting the use of data to the original purpose is not a workable solution in the Big Data era
because the main value in such data lies in secondary uses, including some that have not yet been
imagined. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 153.
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requirement under the commercial speech doctrine; and, it draws an
analogy to a 2012 U.S. Supreme Court case that held an opt-in regime to
be constitutionally required in the context of First Amendment rights of
non-union member public employees. 13  The Article concludes that an
opt-in requirement helps guide the law back to its intended purpose:
protecting individual rights and liberties.
The point of this Article is not to deride the Big Data era in toto, as it
brings substantial benefits that do not involve privacy concerns of
individuals or democratic concerns of the collective whole. 14  Rather,
the intent is to contribute to the scholarship seeking to create a better
balance between the financial interests of online commercial data
processors and fundamental human interests in privacy. An opt-in
requirement may not be sufficient to protect privacy and democratic
interests, but it is an important part of the solution. Requiring online
commercial actors to receive an individual's express, affirmative, and
informed consent would "nudge"'15 the law and society back to a focus
on the interests of individuals and, could help improve our democratic
process.
II. ONLINE DATA PROCESSING AND CYBERSPACE EXCEPTIONALISM
Data collection is growing increasingly ubiquitous as society moves
toward the "Internet of Things ' ' 16 where people are being tracked by a
13. Knox v. SEIU, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295-96 (2012).
14. One example of such benefits is the use of Big Data to more accurately predict the causes of
manhole cover explosions. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 152. For
other examples, see OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, infra note 16, at 2.
15. See generally, RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009). While Thaler and Sunstein popularized use of the
term "nudge" to describe the use of legal rules in a libertarian paternalistic way to guide people towards
wise choices, people have been nudged for a long time, and not always for the good of the order.
Commercial actors have been nudging individuals for their financial benefit for a long time. VANCE
PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 214 (2007 ed.) ("The disturbing Orwellian configurations of the
world toward which the persuader seem to be nudging us - even if unwittingly - can be seen most
clearly in some of their bolder more imaginative efforts."); Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra
note 2, at 1001 ("Market manipulation is, essentially, nudging for profit.").
16. A May 2014 report from the Executive Office of the President provides the following
description:
The "Internet of Things" is a term used to describe the ability of devices to communicate with
each other using embedded sensors that are linked through wired and wireless networks. These
devices could include your thermostat your car, or a pill you swallow so the doctor can monitor
the health of your digestive tract. These connected devices use the Internet to transmit, compile,
and analyze data.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 2
(May 1, 2014) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES]; Debra
Donston-Miller, The Internet of Things Poses New Security Challenges, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2014),
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variety of devices, including their own cars 17 and cell phones. 18 "[B]ig
data refers to things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a
smaller one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, in
ways that change markets, organizations, the relationship between
citizens and governments, and more."'19 The Big Data era is possible
due to the increased ability to "datify," and then monetize,
information.20  Due the growing pervasiveness of Big Data, the opt-in
requirement proposed here is intended to apply to all types of data
processing by all types commercial actors, including data brokers,
advertising organizations, and individual companies.2' Online
behavioral advertising is used as one example of data processing
because of its prevalent use by online commercial actors and because it
illustrates how data profiles can be used to the detriment of individuals.
"Data processing" refers to the collection, use, sale, and disclosure of
data.22 Disclosure of data could be disclosed to a third-party, or within
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sungardas/201 4/02/25/the-intemet-of-things-poses-new-security-
challenges/. See also, MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 173 (drawing a
distinction between the Internet age and the Big Data era).
17. Jacyln Trop, The Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your Car, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 2014, at B1.
18. Peter Maas & Megha Rajagopalan, That's No Phone. That's My Tracker, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2012, at SR5.
19. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 6; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 16 (noting that there are various definitions of Big Data,
but that "[m]ost definitions reflect the growing technological ability to capture aggregate, and process an
ever-greater volume, velocity, and variety of data.").
20. Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier define "datafication" as:
taking information about all things under the sun-including one we never used to think of as
information at all, such as a person's location, the vibrations of an engine, or the stress on a
bridge-and transforming it into a data format to make it quantified. This allows us to use the
information in new ways, such as in predictive analysis[.]
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 15.
21. This approach is consistent with a 2012 recommendation that a Do Not Track system should
apply broadly to all data processing. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICY MAKERS 53 (2012)
[hereinafter FTC, RAPID CHANGE] ("an effective Do Not Track system should go beyond simply opting
consumers out of receiving targeted advertisements; it should opt them out of collection of behavioral
data for all purposes other than those that would be consistent with the context of the interaction").
22. The European Parliament's recently proposed General Data Protection Regulation provides
the following definition:
"processing" means any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data or
sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording,
organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure
by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination,
erasure or destruction[.]
European Parliament, General Data Protection Regulation, Comp. Art 4(3) (version Oct. I1, 2013)
[hereinafter EU GDPR].
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an integrated company, such as when Google combines an individual's
video viewing activities on YouTube with content that she sends or
receives via Gmail. Data processing often results in profiling
individuals. Profiling is used to make predictions about individuals
based on statistics and inferences.23  One main purpose of data
processing and the resulting profiles is to engage in online behavioral
advertising.
Advertising can be divided into the categories of run-of-network
advertising, contextual advertising, and behavioral advertising.24 This
Article is focused specifically on the online behavioral advertising
category because it raises heightened privacy concerns. 25 Run-of-
network advertising describes widespread advertising, regardless of
context and without profiling individuals.26  Publishing the same
advertisement on all of the broadcast networks in prime time is a classic
example of run-of-network advertising and for a time was extremely
effective in reaching a mass audience.27 At the other end of the
spectrum is online behavioral advertising, which can be defined as
"large-scale and long-term collection, storage, analysis and, in some
cases, sharing of data about Internet users." 28  Contextual advertising is
23. The recently proposed General Data Protection Regulation of the European Parliament
provides the following definition: 'profiling' means any form of automated processing of personal data
intended to evaluate certain aspects relating to a natural person or predict in particular that natural
person's performance at work, economic situation, location, health, personal preferences, reliability or
behavior." EU GDPR, Comp. Art. 4(3)(a) (version Oct. 11, 2013).
24. Katherine J. Standburg, Free Fall: The Online Market's Consumer Preference Disconnect 99
(2013), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2323961 [hereinafter Strandburg, Free
Fall].
25. Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican, Media Diversity & Online Advertising, 76 ALB. L. REV.
665, 681 (2013) ("One of the main concerns is the use of users' information for behavioral, rather than
contextual, advertising.") [hereinafter Ammori & Pelican, Media Diversity].
26. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24.
27. TUROw, THE DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 162 ("From the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s
it was possible to place commercials on CBS, NBC, and ABC in the evening - prime time - and reach
around 90 percent of all households in American with their sets on. That typically translated to more
than 60 percent of all homes."). Due to the rise of cable, satellite, and broadband, "commercials on those
three still-major networks reach only about 30 percent of households during a typical prime-time
period," not to mention technology that allows viewers to fast forward through commercials. Id.
28. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 100. There are other definitions of "online
behavioral advertising." In 2009, the FTC described online behavioral advertising as "the tracking of
consumers' online activities in order to deliver tailored advertising.... [A] practice, which is typically
invisible to consumers..." FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF REPORT, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2 (2009) [hereinafter FTC, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES]. An
industry report defined online behavioral advertising as:
the collection of data online from a particular computer or device regarding Web viewing
behaviors over time and across non-affiliate Web sites for the purpose of using such data to
predict user preferences or interests to deliver advertising to that computer or device based on
the preferences or interests inferred from such Web viewing behaviors.
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a category between run-of-network and behavioral advertising.
An industry report defined contextual advertising as the delivery of
"advertisements based on the content of a Web page, a search query, or
a user's contemporaneous behavior on the Web site.",29 Two examples of
contextual advertising help distinguish it from behavioral advertising.
First, a ticket broker that places an ad on a sports-related website is an
example of contextual advertising because the ticket broker is targeting
a sports audience. A second example is when someone runs a search for
Hawaiian vacations and an algorithm generates an advertisement for
flights to Hawaii next to the search results. The critical difference
between this example of contextual advertising and behavioral
advertising is that the Hawaiian vacation ad is generated based on one,
isolated search; whereas behavioral advertising is based on long-term
and large-scale data collection.30  The former is significantly less
problematic than the latter because it is not based on nor results in a
profile of an individual.3' It is based on merely one search.
Interestingly, at least one study suggests that this type of contextual
advertising is more effective than behavioral advertising. 32
A. Online Data Processing Is Exceptional
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a debate about whether cyberlaw
is an independent field of study or whether laws involving cyberspace
AM. ASSOC. OF ADVERTISING AGENCIES, ET AL., SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING 2 (2009), available at httpJ/www.iab.net/media/file/ven-principles-07-01-09.pdf [hereinafter
AAAA, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES]. This report expressly excludes the collection and use of data by a
website for its own uses from the definition. Id. Excluding "first-party" online behavioral advertising is too
narrow, especially considering sharing that occurs within an integrated company, such as Google. The
Center for Democracy and Technology subsequently published a report critiquing the industry's definition of
behavioral advertising as too narrow. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING: INDUSTRY'S CURRENT SELF-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS NECESSARY, BUT STILL
INSUFFICIENT ON ITS OWN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 8-13 (2009), available at
https://www.cdt.org/fles/pdfs/CDT%200nine%2Behavioral %2Advertising/2OReport.pdf [hereinafter
CDT, INSUFFICIENT SELF-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK].
29. Id. at 8.
30. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 6-7.
31. At least some privacy advocates agree that contextual advertising is less problematic than
behavioral advertising. CDT, INSUFFICIENT SELF-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 8
("CDT believes that contextual advertising... poses fewer privacy risks and better aligns with
consumer expectations about how data is being collected and used and therefore may need a different set
of protections.").
32. See generally Jun Yan, et al., How Much Can Behavioral Targeting Help Online
Advertising?, 18TH INT. WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE (2009), available at
http://www.wwwconference.org/www2009/proceedings/pdf/p261.pdf. Strandburg notes that this study
is often cited to show the value of behavioral advertising, but that the study is more accurately described
as showing the benefits of contextual advertising or "short term" behavioral advertising. Strandburg,
Free Fall, supra note 24, at 11-12.
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can be analyzed in the context of the specific area of law involved, such
as studying online contract formation in a Contracts course, as opposed
to a standalone Cyberlaw course.33 Over a decade ago, David Post
framed the debate as one between unexceptionalism and exceptionalism,
and explained why laws affecting cyberspace often deserve their own
consideration.34  This Article concurs with Post's exceptionalist
analysis, which, in turn, supports an argument for an opt-in regime.
An unexceptional view is that cyberspace is no different than real
physical space and reliance on existing laws for the regulation of
cyberspace is sufficient.35 An exceptional view is that there is
something unique about cyberspace that calls for independent inquiry.
Post believes that some interactions in cyberspace are not functionally
identical to interactions in real space. 36 While smoke signals and online
message boards are both used to communicate, they are not functionally
identical methods of communication. While cannon balls and nuclear
bombs are both weapons, they are not functionally identical in scope of
harm. "Scale matters. 37 So do network effects.38
Neither data processing nor profiling individuals by commercial
actors are unique to cyberspace. Axciom, a marketing company, 39 has
collected data and created profiles on individuals for over forty years.40
In 1957, Vance Packard detailed the lengths to which commercial actors
went in order to improve the effectiveness of their advertising through
"depth manipulation. ''41 Neither online data collection nor profiling,
however, is functionally identical to offline data collection or the
"primitive" targeting techniques described by Packard.42 Consequently,
online data processing generally and behavioral advertising specifically
are exceptional.43  Indeed, there are several ways that online data
33. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 201 (1996) with Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 501 (1999).
34. David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy, " 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002).
One does not need to be either exceptionalist or unexceptionalist in all instances. Context matters.
Sometimes offline laws neatly map onto the online world. Sometimes they do not. In either case, the
study of Cyberlaw allows us to engage in the inquiry.
35. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CH. L. REv. 1199 (1998).
36. See generally Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy,"supra note 33.
37. Id. at 1377.
38. DAvID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING
ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD, 509-542 (2010).
39. AXCIOM, http://acxiom.com/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
40. Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, supra note 6.
41. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS, supra note 15, at 31-36.
42. Tsesis, Indefinite Retention of Data, supra note 2, at 444 ("An ISP-like America Online and
EarthLink-can consolidate more information about users than their families and closest friends know
and even more than the subject may even remember.").
43. Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 1003 ("this new combination of
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processing in this new era presents unique problems.
First, scale matters. Due to quickly developing technology, data
processing occurs at an "unprecedented scale.""4  Second, the
exponential increase in the scale of data processing is more than a
quantitative change; it results in qualitative changes.45 Ryan Calo noted
that Big Data provides data processors with the new ability to influence
individuals through the use of highly personalized messaging in ways
that the "depth manipulators" of Packard's era could only dream.46
Katherine Strandburg highlighted two other qualitative changes
resulting from online data collection: interconnectedness and
impenetrability.
47
Interconnectedness means that user data does not rest in the hands of
a single actor. Network effects matter. The ability to share that data
among multiple actors in the Big Data era is dramatically
distinguishable from past sharing capabilities. Databases are
interconnected, data is sold to third-parties, and data is shared among
integrated companies, such as Google search, Gmail, and YouTube.48
The web browser, Firefox, helps illuminate the problem of
interconnectedness through its add-on feature, Lightbeam (formerly
known as Collusion). Lightbeam illustrates how user information from
a website that a user visits is shared with third-party sites, including sites
a user does not visit.49  For example, I am not on Facebook, but
Facebook is on me. In other words, several websites I visit share
information about me with Facebook. Unfortunately, Lightbeam does
not indicate what information is shared, which segues into Strandburg's
second exceptionalist observation: impenetrability.
A user would have a difficult, if not impossible, time determining
interpersonal manipulation with large-scale data presents a novel challenge to consumers and regulators
alike.").
44. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art 1, Recital 5; Jeff Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, or
Not Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1033-40
(1999) [hereinafter Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out] (providing several examples of the types of
databases that exist and the information that is available on individuals); Daniel Solove, The Virtues of
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 970 (2003)
(hereinafter, Solove, Virtues of Knowing Less).
45. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 6.
46. Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 999 ("digitization of commerce
dramatically alters the capacity of firms to influence consumers at personal level.").
47. Standburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 72.
48. TUROW, THE DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 73 ("Some publishers... purchase data about
their registrants from information vendors such as Experian and Acxiom and append them to their
files.").
49. "Lightbeam is a Firefox add-on that enables you to see the first and third party sites you
interact with on the Web. Using interactive visualizations, Lightbeam shows you the relationships
between these third parties and the sites you visit." Lightbeam for Firefox, MOZILLA,
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/lightbeam/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
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how her data has been, collected, used or shared among various
companies because firms do not willingly reveal such information.50
While there are legitimate business reasons to keep information secret,
such as protecting trade secrets, there is also the "creepiness" factor:
firms do not want users to know exactly how much information is
collected, used, and disclosed because many individuals would be
creeped out.51 Individuals involved in consumer transactions or personal
interactions are not the only ones creeped out. Both major party
presidential campaigns engaged in data collection "behind the scenes"
because they did not want voters to "get creeped out."52 Similarly,
physicians are sometimes creeped out by what information
pharmaceutical sales representatives possess and use to promote their
companies' drugs to prescribing physicians. 53 An opt-in regime is one
way to break through the impenetrability because it would require
disclosure of data processing practices and require data processors to
honor an individual's choice to avoid being subject to data processing.
Third, the use of predictive analysis through algorithms creates the
50. TUROW, THE DAILY You, supra note 4, at I ("At the start of the twenty-first century, the
advertising industry is guiding one of history's most massive stealth efforts in social profiling.");
Richard M. Smith, The Web Bug FAQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Nov. 11, 1999),
http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Marketing/webbug.html (Web "bugs" are invisible "[tlo hide the fact that
monitoring is taking place.").
51. See TUROW, THE DAILY You, supra note 4, at 7 ("creeped out is phrase people often use
when they learn about" data processing activities) (emphasis in original), 94 (Team Detroit executive
vice-president Scott Lang describing targeting Facebook friends by indicating their friend liked a car as
"creepy in the beginning, but... they slowly get used to it"), 124 (a group manager for Microsoft's
Bing News stating that automated personalization of news used in a "visible way would be creepy,
many believe"); Tanner, The Web Cookies is Dying, supra note 8. In describing the lengths to which
Target seeks to hide its data processing practices to avoid creeping out its targets, one Target executive
told a reporter:
"With the pregnancy products, though, we leamed that some women react badly," the executive
said. "Then we started mixing in all these ads for things we knew pregnant women would never
buy, so the baby ads looked random. We'd put an ad for a lawn mower next to diapers. We'd put
a coupon for wineglasses next to infant clothes. That way, it looked like all the products were
chosen by chance."
"And we found out that as long as a pregnant woman thinks she hasn't been spied on, she'll use
the coupons. She just assumes that everyone else on her block got the same mailer for diapers
and cribs. As long as we don't spook her, it works."
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all.
52. Kashmir ill, The Obama And Romney Campaigns Know If You'ie Visited Porn Sites. Why 'Do
Not Track' Matters, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2012), http)/www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/10/16/the-
obama-and-romney-campaigns-know-if-youve-visited-pom-sites-why-do-not-track-matters/.
53. Katie Thomas, Glaxo Says It Will Stop Paying Doctors to Promote Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2013, at Al ("'As a physician, I periodically meet with these sales reps and they usually come in
armed with information about me that I don't even know,' he said, like the number of prescriptions he
writes for the drug company's product. 'I feel that's not really a comfortable interaction to have."').
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risk of replacing judgment based on actions with judgment based on
probable propensities.54 There is no dispute that such predictive analysis
occurs. An industry created definition of online behavioral advertising
expressly states that the purpose of such data processing is "to predict
user preferences or interests to deliver advertising to that computer or
device based on the preferences or interests inferred from such Web
viewing behaviors." 55 The use of such statistical inferences to profile
individuals will affect the advertisements one is shown or discounts
offered. 56 Many consumers will welcome this activity because it
provides them with useful information and lowers their search costs.
But, there are also costs to individuals. An opt-in allows an individual
to choose whether the benefits are worth the costs. At this time,
individuals do not have such a choice.
Fourth, Big Data makes prior legal and technical means used to
protect privacy ineffective. 57  Several commentators state that reliance
on notice and consent mechanisms do not work well to protect online
privacy. 58 Notice and consent regimes do not work effectively enough,
in part, because privacy policies are notoriously vague and broad.59 One
reason that privacy policies are vague and broad is because the current
default is that an individual has to opt-out of data processing, if there is
such an option at all, and a firm has natural business incentives to
prevent the individual from opting-out: firms want data on as many
individuals as possible. 60  Another reason that notice and consent
regimes do not work effectively enough is that contract terms and
54. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 151.
55. AAAA, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 1.
56. TUROW, DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 158; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 16, at 46.
57. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 192 ("[Big data] renders
ineffective the core technical and legal mechanisms through which we currently try to protect privacy.").
58. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 69. ("The behavioral advertising business model
gives companies an insatiable thirst for personal information and drives them to obfuscate the extent of
data collection from consumers. Those imperatives cannot be avoided by improving 'notice and choice'
or even by more robust consent regimes); Tsesis, Indefinite Retention of Data , supra note 2, at 433
("The concept of informed consent is often misleading on websites with policies that are written for
lawyers and difficult to understand by ordinary Internet users."); but see Ryan Calo, Against Notice
Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012); Paul Ohm, Branding
Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907 (2013) (Ohm suggests requiring a company to change their brand image
to signal significant changes in its privacy policy as a form of notice to users).
59. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 57 ("Privacy policies are notoriously ineffective at
providing information to consumers about online businesses' data practices.").
60. Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, supra note 44, at 1105; TUROW, DAILY*YOU, supra note 4, at
87 (website owners are incentivized to "create privacy policies to hide particulars of [data] buyers'
audience-tracking and targeting activities from visitors to their sites); Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note
24, at 61 ("Companies have every incentive to keep these transaction costs high in order to discourage
consumers from taking steps to avoid data collection."). Price discrimination is a specific example of
information that firms naturally would not want to share with individuals. Id. at 58.
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privacy polices often go unread.61  Although some individual
responsibility and accountability is warranted, there are limits to the
persuasiveness of the argument that individuals lack information about a
company's data processing practices because of indifference.62 Even if
the scope of contracts one enters into is limited to online privacy
policies, one study concluded that it would take an average of 201 hours
per year for an individual to read the privacy policies of all the websites
she visited in a year.63
Not only do existing legal mechanisms fail to protect privacy from
online data processing, existing technical mechanisms are also
inadequate. One example is the "broken promise" of anonymity.64
Studies have shown that is relatively easy to re-identify or de-anonymize
a user with very few inputs. 65 Additionally, anonymous data can easily
be revealed by enticing an individual to provide identifying information
to participate in activities, such as sweepstakes. 66 Thus, anonymization
cannot be relied upon to protect online privacy because it is technically
ineffective.67 Because of the ease with which anonymous data can be
de-anonymized, the distinction between "personally identifiable
information" and "non-personall identifiable information" as a basis to
protect privacy is not workable.6 8 It is important to note, however, that
technical mechanisms can be part of the solution to protecting privacy
from online data processing.69
Striking a balance between individual privacy and the financial
61. This informed consent problem is not exceptional to cyberspace. E.g., MARGRET JANE
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013).
62. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 56 ("It is unreasonable to conclude that a
consumer's lack of information results from indifference.").
63. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 1/S: J.
OF L. & POLY FOR THE INFO. Soc'Y 543, 562 (2008). "Nationally, if Americans were to read online
privacy policies word-for-word, we estimate the value of time lost as about $781 billion annually." Id.
64. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).
65. Id. at Part I.A. 1.3 and n.4 (citing Latanya Sweeney, Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in
the U.S. Population (Laboratory for Intl Data Privacy, Working Paper LIDAP-WP4, 2000); Philippe
Golle, Revisiting the Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the US Population, 5 ACM WORKSHOP ON
PRIVACY IN THE ELEC. SOC'Y 77, 78 (2006)).
66. TUROW, DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 100.
67. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 154; OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 16, at 8.
68. See generally Ohm, Broken Promises, supra note 64.
69. Although existing technical mechanisms are ineffective, that is not a reason to abandon use
of technical mechanisms as part of the solution for protecting individuals' privacy from online data
processing. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Disruptions: Internet's Sad Legacy: No More Secrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2013, at B8 ("This may be one of those once-in-a-generation moments when we recalibrate the
powers of the citizens and the state ..... And that change can happen on the technological side, where
the technologists that are disillusioned by the incessant tracking will use their skills to make surveillance
more costly.").
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interests of commercial actors is not a new problem.70 The examples
above, however, help show that the Big Data era has fundamentally
changed our society in exceptional ways. While these technological
developments have provided financial benefits to commercial actors,71
these financial benefits come at the expense individual privacy
interests.72 Further, these technological developments have also made
existing legal mechanisms for protecting privacy ineffective, which
demands new legal responses. Of course, this is not the first time that
technological development has disrupted existing legal regimes.
"Just as the printing press prepared the ground for laws guaranteeing
free speech-which didn't exist earlier because there was so little
written expression to protect-the age of big data will require new rules
to safeguard the sanctity of the individual. 73 This insight shows that we
cannot rely on existing laws to protect fundamental privacy interests,
just as we could not rely on existing laws to protect freedom of
expression after the printing press created a dramatic increase in the
amount of written expression. At that time, new laws were necessary to
protect against censorship and patronage 74 because those restrictions
threatened individuals' dignity interests in free expression. At this time,
new laws are necessary to protect fundamental privacy interests that
online data processing threatens.75
The use of probabilities and algorithms threaten one's access to
mortgage loans, health care, or employment.76 Additionally, the use of
online data processing threatens to undermine intangible interests unique
to human beings by the commodification of humanity. For these
70. E.g., PACKARD, HIDDEN PERSUADERS, supra note 15, at 240 ("The most serious offense
many of the depth manipulators commit... is that they try to invade the privacy of our minds.").
71. In two years, Google went from zero to $2.08 billion from advertisements appearing next to
search results. TUROW, DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 65.
72. To be sure, Big Data has public interest benefits as well. See generally MAYER-
SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9; Jane Yakowitz (n/k/a Jane Bambauer), Tragedy of
the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. TECH. 1 (2011). These public interest benefits are worth protecting,
but are beyond the scope of this Article. The solution proposed here seeks to avoid disrupting the public
interest benefits that big data can provide by focusing on commercial data processing.
73. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 17.
74. For further information on literary patronage, see generally DUSTIN GRIFFIN, LITERARY
PATRONAGE IN ENGLAND 1650-1800 (1996).
75. For example, to protect privacy interests in the Big Data era, the law must reconceptualize
when information is "private," even though third-parties possess the information. Shaun Spencer, The
Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65 S. CAR. L. REv. 373 (2013). Spencer
notes that existing law often finds that an individual does not have a protectable privacy interest when
the information is possessed by a third-party. He advocates for a contextual, as opposed to a binary,
conception of privacy because the binary conception of privacy: (1) "ignores the difference between
sharing with third parties as ends and sharing with third parties as means;" (2) "ignores the anti-
aggregation norm--our deep seated aversion to mass surveillance;" and (3) "rests upon a flawed
assumption of consent." Id at 401.
76. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKtER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 17.
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reasons and others, this Article asserts that meaningful consent is
required before online commercial actors engage in data processing. An
opt-in consent mechanism is a necessary condition to help restore a
proper respect for fundamentally humanistic interests. 77  An opt-in
requirement is a necessary part of the solution because it helps restore
the primacy of individual privacy interests in the Big Data era. Before
further analysis of the opt-in requirement, some elaboration on the
privacy interests at stake is necessary because privacy itself is an
unsettled concept.
III. PRIVACY
Compared to other areas of law, such as contracts and torts, privacy
law is "relatively young. 78  The roots of American privacy law are
generally attributed to Samuel D. Warren's and Louis D. Brandeis' 1890
article, The Right to Privacy.79  A singular definition of privacy
continues to elude commentators.8 ° Perhaps there will never be a
singular definition because "[p]rivacy is a chameleon that shifts
meaning depending on context 81 and contexts continually change.
Nevertheless, we can identify privacy interests involved in the context
of commercial data processing generally and behavioral advertising
specifically.
A. Privacy Interests and Theory
Several commentators believe that privacy determinations must be
contextual. 82 Under the rules of evidence for example, the same piece
77. Cf PACKARD, HIDDEN PERSUADERS, supra note 15, at 34 ("All this probing and
manipulation has... seriously antihumanistic implications. Much of it seems to represent regress rather
than progress for man in his long struggle to become a rational and self-guiding being.").
78. Solove, Virtues of Knowing Less, supra note 44, at 1030. Then again, perhaps like the
concept of privacy itself, one's perspective of time is relative depending on the context. See Kang,
Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, supra note 12, at 1999 ("A conversation about
privacy, of course, has been ongoing for a long time.").
79. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Seventy years later, William Prosser analyzed hundreds of privacy cases since the Warren and Brandeis
article and created a list of four invasion of privacy torts: (1) false light; (2) public disclosure of private
facts; (3) intrusion upon seclusion; and (4) misappropriation. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L.
REV. 383, 389 (1960).
80. "'Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy,' philosopher Judith Jarvis
Thomson has observed, 'is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is."' Daniel Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480 (2006) (quoting Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right
to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 272 (Ferdinand David
Schoeman ed., 1984)).
81. Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, supra note 12, at 1202.
82. E.g., NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, infra note 85; SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
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of evidence may or may not be admissible depending on the context.83
Similarly, whether particular information receives privacy protection
may depend on the context.84 In this Article, the relevant context is an
individual's informational privacy interests that are threatened by online
commercial actors.8 5 Informational, or data, privacy "concerns an
individual's control over the processing-i.e. the acquisition, disclosure,
and use-of personal information." 86  Online data processing by
commercial actors affects several interests that informational privacy
protects.
1. Specific Privacy Interests
Privacy is both an interest in itself, such as the right to be alone, and a
proxy for protecting other interests that would be harmed without
privacy protection. First, informational privacy protects the dignity
interests of individual human beings. When an expert panel
recommended that the Obama Administration drastically curtail the
N.S.A.'s surveillance activities, it specifically cited their interest in
safeguarding "the privacy and dignity of American citizens." 87 As the
opening epigraph above shows, a majority of the Supreme Court also
recognized that data processing creates risk to individuals' personal
privacy and dignity interests. Similarly, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union expressly provides, "Everyone has the
right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her." 88
Second, informational privacy protects individual autonomy. 89  Neil
Richards set forth a theory of intellectual privacy that, in part, protects
individual autonomy from unwarranted intrusions.90  An opt-in
requirement directly supports the autonomy interest because the
individual retains the right to choose to participate in data processing.
An opt-out mechanism is insufficient due to informational asymmetry
PRIVACY, infra note 85; Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, supra note 13, at 1202.
83. Solove, Virtues of Knowing Less, supra note 44, at 1031.
84. Id.
85. Jerry Kang described three "clusters" of privacy categories: (1) physical space; (2) decisional
or choice, such as the right to choose abortion; and (3) informational privacy. Kang, Information
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, supra note 12, at 1202-03. For other taxonomies of privacy, see,
e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008); and, HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009) [hereinafter
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT].
86. Id. at 1203.
87. David E. Sanger & Charlie Savage, Obama is Urged to Sharply Curb N.S.A. Data Mining,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2013, at Al.
88. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 8(1), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 397.
89. Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 1024-34.
90. Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 404 (2008).
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and power imbalances between individuals and private commercial
actors, as well the natural financial incentive of firms to maintain these
conditions.91
Third, informational privacy is important to more than just the
individual involved. Informational privacy helps protect the democratic
process. Commentators have explained how protecting informational
privacy can help the democratic process.92  President Obama's
introductory letter to the 2012 White House report on Consumer Data
Privacy in A Networked World states that privacy has been at the "heart
of our democracy since its inception. 93 And, the Court has also
recognized the importance of informational privacy in a democratic
society. 94  Thus, there is broad consensus that privacy has a role in a
functional democratic society.
Fourth, associational privacy is particularly relevant when
considering online privacy.95 Justice Sotomayor made this observation
in her concurring opinion in United State v. Jones in the context of
government surveillance where the majority held that attaching a GPS
91. See OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 16, at 39
("While big data will be a powerful engine for economic growth and innovation, there remains the
potential for a disquieting asymmetry between consumers and the companies that control information
about them.").:
92. See, e.g., Cohen, What Privacy is For, supra note 11, at 1905; Paul Schwartz, Privacy &
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (1999).
93. THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK
FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-fnal.pdf) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE
PRIVACY REPORT].
94. In 2001, the Court stated:
In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if citizens are to think and act
creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that one's speech is being monitored by a
stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the
willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202
(1967)). Although Bartnicki held that publication of an illegally recorded telephone conversation was
protected by the First Amendment because the publisher did not participate in the illegal act and
lawfully obtained the tape, the Court emphasized that the conversation involved a matter of public
importance. Id. at 533-34. Online commercial data processing does not involve matters of public
importance. Rather, it involves private information used for private financial gain. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1985) (credit report is not a matter
of public concern, it is "speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience"); and, Trans Union Corp. v. F.T.C., 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Like the credit
report in Dun & Bradstreet... the information about individual consumers and their credit performance
communicated by Trans Union target marketing lists is solely of interest to the company and its business
customers and related to no matter of public concern.").
95. Ammori & Pelican, Media Diversity, supra note 25, at 674; Peter Swire, Social Networks,
Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 137 1,
1377 (2012).
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tracking device to an individual's vehicle without a warrant violated the
Fourth Amendment.96 Associational privacy is also intruded upon when
private actors engage in data processing, such as by tracking an
individual through geolocation technology or when mobile app
providers have accessed users' contacts without notice.97
Finally, there is a qualified First Amendment right to engage in
anonymous speech. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission held that
there is a First Amendment right to distribute anonymous leaflets
opposing a ballot issue.98  Relatedly, a right to read anonymously is
noted as an important aspect of privacy. 99 An example of the right to
read anonymously being violated by Big Data actors is the tracking of e-
readers' reading activities. 100
In short, data processing by commercial actors brings into conflict a
variety of individual interests protected by informational privacy and the
financial interests of artificial entities. Big data actors are aware of the
individual privacy interests at stake. Indeed, some of the largest Big
Data actors recently acknowledged the importance of individual privacy,
at least when the government is the data processor.
2. Data Processors Acknowledge Individuals' Privacy Interests
In December 2013, Facebook, Google, Yahoo and other tech giants
published an open letter calling for "Global Government Surveillance
Reform."'1 1  In addition to the open letter, the companies listed five
principles as the bases for their position. Although these companies
focused on government surveillance, the first three of their privacy
principles equally apply to these companies and other private actors if
you substitute "government" with "firms." The fourth principle,
unsurprisingly, somewhat subtly seeks to avoid application of these
principles to private actors.' 0 2
Principle one is "Limiting Governments' Authority to Collect Users'
Information." The tech giants call for this limitation because of "users'
96. 132 S.Ct. 945, 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("Awareness that the Government may be
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.").
97. Ammori & Pelican, Media Diversity, supra note 25, at 679-80.
98. Id. at 682.
99. Id. at 681; Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management " in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 981-82 (1996).
100. David Streitfeld, As New Services Track Habits, the E-Books are Reading You, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2013, at Al.
101. REFORM GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE, http://reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2014). The full list of companies is: AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google, Linkedln,
Microsoft, Twitter, and Yahoo.
102. The fifth principle, "Addressing Conflicts Among Governments," is not applicable to this
Article.
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reasonable privacy interests" and the notion that the government "should
not undertake bulk data collection." 10 3 This principle equally applies to
private companies because it is not the public or private nature of the
data processor that matters. 10 4 Rather, what matters are the reasonable
privacy interests of individuals in not being subject to bulk data
collection resulting in detailed profiles without their consent.
Principle two calls for "Oversight and Accountability." An opt-in
regime is one method for creating oversight and accountability because
it would empower individuals to decide whether to opt-in to data
processing after receiving information regarding a commercial actor's
data practices. 10 5  Principle three calls for "Transparency About
Government Demands" because transparency is "essential to a debate
over governments' surveillance powers and the scope of those programs
that are administered under those powers.'' 0 6  Transparency is also
essential to a debate over the data processing activities of online
commercial actors. Because firms have a natural incentive to not be
transparent in their data processing activities, an opt-in regime nudges
them towards transparency, and thus, to oversight and accountability.
The fourth principle, however, seeks to carve out special protections
for private actors and to counter the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) recently proposed by the European Parliament. 0 7 If enacted,
the European Parliament's proposed GDPR would provide every natural
person with the right to object to profiling. 108 The fourth principle of the
Big Data actors is titled, "Respecting the Free Flow of Information," and
states that "[g]ovemments should not inhibit access by companies or
individuals to lawfully available information that is stored outside the
country."' 0 9 This principle shows that the tech giants do not believe the
same principles regarding limits on data collection, oversight,
accountability, and transparency equally apply to private actors. The
flaw in this principle is that it loses sight of the reasons for these
principles in the first place: protecting individual privacy interests from
103. REFORM GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101.
104. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); Cohen,
What Privacy is For, supra note 11, at 3.
105. Other methods that seek to protect privacy also help create oversight and accountability. E.g.,
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9, at 179-82 (proposing a new profession-
"algorithmists"-to monitor and advise companies based on their use of algorithms in data processing).
106. REFORM GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101.
107. The proposed EU Data Protection Regulation would limit a company's ability to share
information about EU citizens with companies not subject to EU privacy protections. This Article cites
the October 2013 version of the proposed GDPR.
108. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art 20(1).
109. .REFORM GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101.
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powerful actors, regardless of whether they are public or private.l 10
Vast data collection and surveillance by government actors is of
serious concern.11' The recent and ongoing disclosures of the scope of
the government's surveillance programs made possible by leaker
Edward Snowden further clarify this point. While government
intrusions into online privacy are of serious concern, they are beyond the
scope of this Article.1 12  There are, however, two points about
government surveillance that are relevant here.
First, "the reason government has access to so much data in the first
place, in many cases, is because corporations collect it." 113  And, news
reports indicate some level of cooperation by private companies in
providing the government with data about individuals. 14 Additionally,
a recent report recommended limiting the government's expansive
surveillance program, in part, because private actors will still possess the
data and the government can simply access it upon lawful requests.''
5
In other words, even if the government itself no longer collects bulk
data, the risk of government surveillance remains high because of the
existence of expansive privately possessed data."
6
Second, this alignment of interests-private actors' commercial
interests in data processing for profit and government interest in data
processing for purposes of law enforcement-will likely add to the
inertia of government regulation that seeks to protect individuals'
110. See also Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309
(2012). Ohm proposes reinterpreting the Fourth Amendment to focus on freedom from government
power, instead of focusing on privacy. Id. at 1311-12. Leaving aside the state action doctrine,
individuals should equally be free from excessive power by private actors. At the very least, such power
infringes on an individual's autonomy rights and the classification as a private actor does not, or at least
should not, make that infringement permissible. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinksy, Rethinking State Action,
80 Nw. U.L. REv. 503 (1985).
111. E.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2013); but see ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
112. For commentary on government actors and online privacy, see, e.g., Richards, The Dangers
of Surveillance, supra note 104.
113. Kate Kaye, Prism Could Be a Watershed Moment for Online Privacy Legislation: Or It




114. Claire Cain Miller, Tech Companies Concede to Surveillance Program, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2013, at A12. Although tech companies have cooperated with the government to some degree, it
appears the government has also covertly collected data from them without their knowledge. Nicole
Periroth & John Markoff, N.S.A. May Have Hit Internet Companies at a Weak Spot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2013, at B1 (stating that the N.S.A. appears to have accessed data from Google and Yahoo, among
others, by accessing their users' data from Internet backbone providers, such as Level 3, Verizon
Communications, BT Group, and Vodaphone).
115. Sanger & Savage, Obama is Urged to Sharply Curb N.S.A. Data Mining, supra note 87.
116. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy & the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1149, 1158-59 (2005).
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privacy interests. Despites these obstacles, an opt-in requirement merits
consideration because it seeks to protect individual privacy interests and
consequently, democracy. One way to help overcome the obstacles
presented by industry and government opposition to data privacy reform
is to show that an opt-in requirement is supported by, or least consistent
with, a law and economics analysis.
B. Privacy and Economic Analysis
Because the financial interest of data processors is a major factor
driving the development of Big Data, an economic analysis of the
struggle between individuals' privacy rights and firms' financial
interests is a common part of the scholarship and the national
conversation. An argument often made against increased regulation of
data processing is that it will result in increased transaction costs,
thereby threatening the information economy and innovation.1 7 As one
commentator wrote, such an argument should be "taken with a grain of
salt." ' 8 Indeed, basic economic theory, behavioral economics, and an
economic theory of privacy each show that one can reasonably make the
claim that law and economics theory actually supports the need for
regulation.
First, basic economic theory applied to data processing by online
commercial actors undercuts arguments against regulation. The basic
actor in neoclassical economics is the individual. Further, maximizing
individual choice is the sine qua non of this theory especially as those
individual choices are reflected in market transactions that send reliable
price signals. By way of example, "[t]he most common normative
justification for a market economy rests on the basic idea that payments
signal [individual] preferences."" 9 Although individuals often do not
pay money for online services or products, some argue that they "pay"
with personal information. 120 Data processors then argue that simply by
using the Internet, an individual signals a preference or a willingness to
allow data processing in exchange for the online goods and services.
12 1
This rationale is flawed. Individuals are mostly unaware of the uses to
which their personal data is put, and thus, cannot consent to what they
do not know. Also, online behavioral advertising is not a basic market
117. E.g., Berin Szoka & Adam Theier, Targeted Online Advertising: What's the Harm and
Where We Heading?, THE PROGRESS AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION, June 2009, at 8; Cohen, Examined
Lives, supra note 6, at 1388.
118. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 68.
119. Id. at 14.
120. E.g., Angwin, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, supra note 2.
121. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 15.
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involving one seller and one buyer. Advertisers are the actual
consumers of data processing, not individuals who have become the
product. 122 And, advertisers are not paying customers for their personal
data; they are paying the data collectors.
Even if individuals are considered to "pay" for online products
and services with their data, that "payment" does not necessarily occur
at the point of purchase. 123 Data processing occurs before, during, and
after the point of purchase. Data processors can track whether an
individual clicked on a particular good, even if they did not buy it and
use that data as part of an individual's profile. Some individuals are
profiled into categories such as, "Very Elderly," "X-tra Needy," and
"Enduring Hardships."'' 24 Data processors can take previously collected
data and connect it with other data, including data purchased from other
data processors, for unknown future uses. Post-transaction data
processing is a significant source of disutility to an individual precisely
because of an individual's lack of knowledge, consent or control of
these transactions; 125 and, it is a major issue of contention because some
view Big Data's secondary uses as a main source of potential value to be
gained from data processing. 126
In short, there is significant information asymmetry between
individuals and online data processors because data processors do not
disclose the information they process, they process data at times before
and after the point of purchase, and because it is impossible for an
individual to signal a preference when data is used post-transaction for a
use that is unknown or unavailable at the time of purchase. Thus, the
basic economic justification that payment signals preference does not
work in the context of online data processing by commercial actors.
Second, from a behavioral economics perspective, opt-in regulation
of online data processing by commercial actors can help correct market
manipulation.1 27  Data processors intentionally create and maintain
information asymmetry between themselves and the individual whose
data is processed. 128 They provide little opportunity to opt-out of data
122. Id.
123. Id. at 43.
124. STAFF OF S. COMM ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANS., 113TH CONG., A REVIEW OF THE
DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, COLLECTION, USE AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING
PURPOSES (Dec. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&Fileid=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631 
-
08f2f255b577 [hereinafter SENATE COMM. REPORT].
125. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 44. Potential sources of disutility include adverse
decisions by potential or existing employers or insurers and price discrimination. Id. 45-46.
126. MAYER-SHONBERGER & CUKIER, BIG DATA, supra note 9.
127. See generally Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 2.
128. SENATE COMM. REPORT, supra note 124.
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processing, let alone opt-in. 129 From a financial perspective, the failure
to disclose data processing practices or offer the ability to opt-out (if
they provide any option at all) is strategically sound. "Companies have
every incentive to keep these transaction costs high in order to
discourage consumers from taking steps to avoid data collection."'' 30
Indeed, "[t]he entire point is to leverage the gap between how a
consumer pursuing her self-interest would behave leading up to the
transaction and how an actual consumer with predictable flaws
behaves when pushed, specifically so as to extract social surplus.' ' 31
Thus, behavioral economics supports an opt-in regime to help reduce
market manipulation.
Finally, a law and economics theory of privacy also supports the need
for regulation of data processing by online commercial actors. Judge
Richard Posner has accurately noted that one purpose of privacy is to
conceal harmful, but truthful information about oneself.' 32 Under
Posner's economic analysis of privacy, this is an invalid or unjustifiable
purpose of privacy because it increases transactions costs and risk by
creating information asymmetry. 133 Applying this economic theory of
privacy to online data processing supports the need for an opt-in
requirement. Data processors intentionally seek to prevent individuals
from knowing about their data processing practices. Their failure to
disclose their data processing practices prior to engaging in data
processing increases the risks and transaction costs of individuals whose
data is processed without notice or consent.
In conclusion, some economics analysis supports an opt-in
requirement. Payment does not signal preference in the online data
processing context because the actual consumer is the advertiser
purchasing the data, not the individual whose data is processed. And,
the individual lacks the necessary information about data processing to
make an informed decision whether to "pay" with her data. Further, a
behavioral economics view strongly suggests that there is a market
failure when it comes to individual online privacy because data
processors are intentionally creating and maintaining informational
asymmetries.' 34 Finally, under Judge Posner's law and economics view
of privacy, online data processors should not be entitled to maintain this
information asymmetry because it is created to hide the data processing
129. Id.
130. Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 61; Sovern, Opting-In, Opting-Out, supra note 44.
131. Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 1023.
132. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 399 (1978).
133. Id. at 398.
134. See generally Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24; Calo, Digital Market Manipulation,
supra note 2.
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activities from the individuals whose data is processed. Regulation is
necessary to correct the market failure because data processors have
every incentive to maintain the information asymmetry. At the very
least, these indicia of market failure cast serious doubts on claims that
self-regulatory solutions are sufficient.
IV. OPTING-IN
The concept of an opt-in requirement as a method to protect
informational privacy is not new. 135  This Article seeks to provide
unique contributions to prior online privacy literature through its First
Amendment analysis in Part V, and in this Part, through a summary of
opt-in analysis by government actors, including the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the White House, courts, and the European Union
(EU).
A. Opting-Out Is Ineffective
An opt-out regime is insufficient to protect individuals' privacy
interests from the actions of online commercial data processors for
several reasons. First, individuals often fail to exercise their right to opt-
out in the online data processing context, as well as other contexts.'
36
For many years, data processing industry actors have known that
individuals often fail to exercise their right to opt out. When Netscape's
Navigator 4.0 was released in 1997, it included an option for individuals
to opt-out of all cookies or certain types of cookies. 137 A draft proposal
by the Internet Engineering Task Force would have required individuals
135. E.g., Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012, S. 1223, §3, 112th Congr. (2012) (the act
would have required private actors to receive an individual's "express authorization" before collecting
or sharing geolocation data from automobile, mobile phones, and other devices); Sovem, Opting-In
Opting-Out, supra note 44; Rick Bruner, Interactive: 'Cookie' Proposal Could Hinder Online
Advertising: Privacy Backers Push for More Data Controls, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 31, 1997,(http://adage.com/article/news/interactive-cookie-proposal-hinder-online-advertising-pfivacy-backers-
push-data-controls/73718/.
136. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) provides an example of a law changing
from an opt-out to an opt-in approach in order to be more effective in protecting privacy. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721. Under the original DPPA, states were not permitted to release a driver's personal information
without consent, but consent was presumed unless the driver opted-out. Driver's Privacy Protection Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 300002, 108 Stat, 2099 (1994). In 1999, Congress amended the DPPA
by requiring a state to receive a driver's express consent before it could release the driver's information.
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-69,
§ 350(c)-(e), 113 Stat. 986, 1025 (1999).
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to opt-in before third-party cookies were accepted. One industry
member described the opt-in proposal as "terrible" from the perspective
of advertising companies. 13
8
Although advertisers were thankful that the Navigator did not adopt
the opt-in proposal, they still had concerns about the opt-out option.
Advertising Age informed readers not to worry about this change
precisely because of the ineffectiveness of an opt-out default: "because
the vast majority of Web users never bother to change their cookie
preferences, the effect on companies that use cookies as targeting tools
will be minimal.' 39  Online data processors have a natural preference
for an opt-out design as opposed to opt-in because it is essentially
"nudging for profit."140
Second, individuals often fail to opt-out because of the lack of
information they have regarding data processing. This information
asymmetry is intentionally perpetuated by the data processing industry.
Terms in a privacy policy concerning data processing are commonly
broad, vague, and buried. Third, not only are terms of data processing
intentionally broad, vague, and buried, the data processing tools
themselves are intentionally hidden. The design of cookies, web bugs,
beacons, and other tracking technologies are intentionally designed to
avoid detection and control by individual users. 141
Finally, even if an opt-out option is offered to individuals, the scope
of the opt-out may be rather limited and difficult to exercise. The
Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) allows individuals to opt-out of
being served behavioral advertising, but does not allow individuals to
opt-out of data collection or profiling. 42 This limited ability to opt-out
is insufficient because it does not prevent data processors from
continuing to place tracking technologies on individuals' devices or
138. Id.
139. Id. Negative option marketing is an example of similar market manipulation. Calo, Digital
Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 1002.
140. Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 1001.
141. For a summary of some of the these types of tracking technologies, see e.g., Christine Suzane
Davik, We Know Who You Are and What You're Made Of: The Illusion of Internet Anonymity and Its
Impact on Protection From Genetic Discrimination, 64 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 17, 23-27 (2013).
142. TUROW, DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 181. Since the publication of Turow's book, the
Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) has addressed this issue to some degree:
More recently, the DAA addressed one of the long-standing criticisms of its approach - how to
limit secondary use of collected data so that the consumer opt out extends beyond simply
blocking targeted ads to the collection of information for other purposes. The DAA has released
new principles that include limitations on the collection of tracking data and prohibitions on the
use or transfer of the data for employment, credit, insurance, or health care eligibility purposes.
FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 21, at 54 (citing Digital Advertising Alliance, About Self-Regulatory
Principles for Multi-Site Data (Nov. 2011), http://www.aboutads.info/resource/downloadiMulti-Site-
Data-Principles.pdf).
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from creating profiles of individuals. The NAI's limited opt-out
mechanism has also been criticized for being "cumbersome and
inaccessible. 143
Although there has been some progress, 144 not much has changed
since 1997 when Advertising Age trumpeted the defeat of an opt-in
feature that would have required a user to opt-in before Navigator would
allow third-party cookies to be accepted by an individual's computer. In
December 2013, a Senate Committee Report concluded that individuals
"should expect that data brokers will draw on this data without their
permission to construct detailed profiles on them reflecting judgments
about their characteristics and predicted behaviors."' 145  From a
descriptive perspective, the Senate Committee Report's conclusion is
accurate. From a normative perspective, however, individuals have
legitimate interests (if not established rights) in not being tracked and
profiled without consent. Both the EU Charter on Fundamental Human
Rights 146 and Supreme Court dicta in Sorrell v. IMS Health provide
support for this normative perspective. 147 Because an opt-out regime is
ineffective, an opt-in regime is necessary to protect these legitimate
privacy interests.
B. Opt-In Law and Policy in the Data Privacy Context
Although there is currently no law that generally requires online
commercial actors to receive an individual's opt-in consent prior to data
processing, there has been some action and policy recommendations by
government actors on this issue. This subpart provides some examples
of government recommendations and actions, as well as case law
regarding an opt-in requirement in the data privacy context. The subpart
concludes with a summary of the opt-in requirement of the EU's
recently proposed General Data Protection Regulation.
143. FTC, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 10.
144. In July 2013, the Digital Advertising Alliance announced new self-regulatory rules requiring
that "ad networks, app developers and others must obtain people's opt-in consent before collecting
geolocation information and address-book data." Wendy Davis, DAA Mobile Privacy Rules Require
Opt-In Consent for Address Books, Geolocation, MEDIAPOST, July 24, 2013,
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/20516 1/daa-mobile-privacy-rules-require-opt-in-
consent-fo.html. But, the new rules won't go into effect for at least nine months and the enforcement
mechanism is uncertain. Id.
145. SENATE COMM. REPORT, supra note 124, at 35.
146. "Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her." Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2 Art. 8(1), 012/C 326/02.
147. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), supra note 1.
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1. Federal Trade Commission Opt-In Recommendations & Actions
The FTC has held numerous workshops, issued several reports, and
taken official action regarding online privacy. 148 These reports focus on
data collection practices, industry self-regulation, and recent
technological advances that affect consumers' privacy. Some of these
FTC recommendations and actions relate to an opt-in or similar
requirement.
In 1998, the FTC provided a report to Congress advising that Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) should be followed when
collecting personal information. 149 Of the five principles, the two most
relevant to this Article are the principles of Notice/Awareness and
Choice/Consent.1 50  The FTC report describes the Notice/Awareness
principle as the "most fundamental" because without notice to data
processing practices, a "consumer cannot make an informed decision as
to whether and to what extent to disclose personal information.' 151 The
1998 Report included analysis of industry guidelines and noted that
none of the guidelines at the time adopted an opt-in regime for adults. 152
The Report concluded that as of 1998, the Commission had not seen
evidence of effective self-regulation, including a* failure to provide
sufficient notice of data processing practices, let alone offer an opt-in
design. 153"  Although the Report recommended that Congress pass
legislation to protect children twelve and under from data processing,
including two opt-in requirements, it made no recommendation
regarding data processing of adults. 154
148. For a convenient list of these activities from 1970-2012, see FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra
note 21, at Appendix A (a color coded index of "FTC Privacy Milestones," including laws and rules,
cases, reports, workshops, and education).
149. FIPPs were first set forth in, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973). Since that time, these
principles have been developed by a variety of government agencies. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
ONLINE PRIVACY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 48, n. 27 (1998) (collecting documents) [hereinafter FTC
REPORT TO CONGRESS].
150. The other three principles are: (1) Access/Participation; (2) Integrity/Security; and (3)
Enforcement/Redress. FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 149, at 7. These principles are also
relevant to online privacy. If an individual does not have Access/Awareness to an online commercial
actor's profile of her, she cannot make a determination if the information is accurate. Without laws
requiring data processors to maintain the Integrity/Security of data collected, individuals are at risk of
further privacy erosion. Without a right to Enforcement/Redress, there is little deterrent to commercial
data processing.
151. FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 149, at 7.
152. FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 149, at 16. Some industry guidelines included an
opt-in requirement in the context of children. Id. at 17.
153. FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 149, at 41.
154. The opt-in requirements for children 12 and under were: (1) receiving a parent's opt-in
consent prior to collecting information that could be used to contact the child offline, and (2) receiving a
parent's opt-in consent prior collecting personal identifying information that would be disclosed to the
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In 2009, the FTC published a staff report regarding data collection
and behavioral advertising that included discussion of an opt-in
mechanism as a possible requirement. 155  The report noted that
consumer and privacy advocates desired an opt-in requirement prior to
data collection. 156  Ultimately, however, the report did not recommend
that an opt-in mechanism should be generally required. 157  Rather, it
limited its opt-in recommendation to "uses of data that raise heightened
privacy concerns-specifically, material changes affecting the use of
previously collected data and the use of sensitive consumer data. 158
Examples of sensitive data included health, finance, or sexual
preference data. 159 The FTC staff report further encouraged advertisers
"to consider whether there may be certain categories of data that are so
sensitive that they should never be used for behavioral advertising."' 6 °
For other uses of data, the FTC staff report simply recommended that
consumers have a "clear, easy-to-use, and accessible" choice regarding
data processing, regardless of whether that choice is an opt-in or an opt-
out mechanism. 161 This 2009 FTC staff report has been criticized as
reflecting too much influence by data processors, in part, because it
recommended that other than "sensitive data," data processing could
occur on an opt-out basis.'
62
In 2012, the FTC issued its report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in
public or third-parties. FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 149, at 43. Even in the context of
children ages 12 and under, the Report recommended opt-out mechanisms for other types of data
processing. Id. Subsequent to this Report, Congress passed the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act of 1998. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506. Although it does not use the term "opt-in," it does require online
actors to receive "verifiable parental consent" when engaging in data processing that involves personal
information from children ages 12 and under. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(ii). "Verifiable parental consent" is
not required under all circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2). Moreover, the definition of "verifiable
parental consent" seems to leave room for something less than the express, affirmative, and informed
opt-in requirement proposed here:
The term "verifiable parental consent" means any reasonable effort (taking into consideration
available technology), including a request for authorization for future collection, use, and
disclosure described in the notice, to ensure that a parent of a child receives notice of the
operator's personal information collection, use, and disclosure practices, and authorizes the
collection, use, and disclosure, as applicable, of personal information and the subsequent use of
that information before that information is collected from that child.
15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(ii).
155. FTC, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 16, 32.
156. Id.at 32.
157. Idat 32, n. 63.
158. Id.
159. TUROW, DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 174.
160. Id.
161. FTC, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 32, n. 63.
162. TuRow, DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 174-75.
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an Era of Rapid Change.163  The report includes discussion about the
use of an opt-in requirement in the context of deep packet inspections
(DPI). 164 Some commenters advocated for an opt-in requirement before
DPI could occur because of the vast amount of information provided via
DPI. 165 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) objected stating that they do
not use DPI for marketing purposes, that similar amounts and types of
data can be gathered via other tracking technologies, and that the FTC's
principles on data processing should apply consistently, regardless of the
particular technology used.1 66 While the FTC stated that DPI is more
invasive than cookies, it agreed that its proposal should be technology
neutral. 167 The opt-in proposal here is consistent with the ISPs call for
similar treatment of data processors because it applies to all types of
data processing by commercial actors, regardless of technology used.
Although the 2012 Report did not recommend receiving opt-in
consent for all data processing, it did acknowledge that data may be
sensitive depending on the person involved.168 Consistent with its 2009
staff report, the 2012 report maintains its recommendation for an opt-in
requirement when a company makes a material change to its privacy
representations or when it collects sensitive data. 169 At least one type of
change that is "material" is sharing information with third-parties when
a prior privacy representation stated that data would not be shared with
third-parties. 170  As far as what data is labeled "sensitive," the FTC
noted general consensus on data regarding children, health, financial,
163. FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 21.
164. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) presents both costs and benefits to individuals:
Deep packet inspection helps your ISP block the spread of computer viruses, identify illegal
downloads, and prioritize the data transmitted by bandwidth-heavy applications like video chat
and VolP applications to alleviate network congestion and improve your service. Law
enforcement officials (with a court order) can use these tools to lawfully intercept
communications of suspected criminals.
But deep packet inspection has a dark side, and in the absence of strict legal restrictions, your
ISP is free to root through all the information you exchange online and use it as they see fit.
Personal data like your age, location, and shopping records can be logged and sold in
anonymized batches to advertising companies, and law enforcement agents can monitor and
curtail your Internet access without your knowledge. Without strict limitations to preserve user
privacy, this sort of deep data filtering can significantly impair your ability to remain anonymous
online.
Alex Wawro, What Is Deep Packet Inspection, PCWoRLD.coM, Feb. 1, 2012,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/249137/what is deep packet inspection_.html.
165. FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 21, at 55.
166. Id. at 55-56.
167. FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 21, at 56.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 57.
170. FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 21, at 58.
2014]
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
Social Security numbers and precise geolocation data.171
In addition to holding workshops and issuing reports and
recommendations, the FTC has engaged in some official action
involving opt-in requirements. In 2004, the FTC issued an Order
requiring Gateway Learning Corporation to receive an individual's
"express affirmative ('opt-in') consent" prior to sharing data with third-
parties. 172 This order, however, is limited in several respects. The order
applied only to Gateway Learning Corporation. It applied only to
"personal information," which as discussed above is likely a futile
limitation in light of the ability to re-identify individuals in the Big Data
era. 173 Finally, the impetus for the order was that Gateway Learning
Corporation violated its own privacy policy. Gateway had a privacy
policy that promised not to sell personal information to third-parties.
Subsequently, it changed that policy, allowing the disclosure of personal
information to third-parties. The order only required Gateway to receive
opt-in consent for the disclosure to third-parties from individuals that
made an agreement under the old policy.174 Opt-in consent was not
required for anyone that entered into an agreement under the new
policy; their personal information could be disclosed to third-parties.
In 2011, the FTC took official action against Google and Facebook in
separate investigations because of concerns about the privacy of their
users. 175  Both of these orders required the companies to create a
comprehensive privacy program to protect individual users' identifiable
information. 176 These orders specifically require that each company
obtain an individual's "affirmative, express consent" prior to sharing
non-public information that materially exceeds the individual's privacy
settings, and disclose the categories of information shared and the
"identity or specific categories of such third parties" with whom it's
shared. 177
Thus, a theme emerges from the FTC reports and orders in the online
171. FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 21, at 59.
172. Gateway Learning Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4120 (Sept. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/09/040917do0423047.pdf.
173. See Part ILA, above.
174. Gateway Learning Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4120, at 3.
175. Google Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist1023136/111024googlebuzzorder.pdf, Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092-
3184 (Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookagree.pdf
For a summary of FTC enforcement actions, see Fatima Nadine Khan, Survey Of Recent FTC Privacy
Enforcement Actions and Developments, 68 BUS. LAW. 225 (2012).
176. Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 092-3136 at 4-5; Facebook Inc., F.T.C. File No. 092-3184 at 5-
6.
177. Google Inc., Id. at 4; Facebook Inc., Id. at 4. These orders also require company-wide
privacy programs that outside auditors will assess for the next twenty years. Google Inc., Id. at 5;
Facebook Inc., Id. at 6.
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privacy context: Opt-in recommendations are generally limited to
material changes in a preexisting privacy policy and "sensitive" data.
But, just as anonymity cannot be relied upon to protect privacy by
segregating personally identifiable information from non-personally
identifiable information, neither can privacy be protected by segregating
sensitive from non-sensitive information. The interconnectedness of
data and data processors can quickly turn non-sensitive data into
"sensitive" data. FTC action to date on opt-in recommendations and
actions is moving in the right direction, but is not comprehensive
enough.
2. White House Action
In 2012, the White House issued its report, Consumer Data Privacy
in a Networked World.178 The report acknowledged that use of personal
data by commercial actors does raise privacy concerns and therefore,
individuals should have some control. 179 Although the term "opt-in,"
does not appear in the report,' 80 the first item in the Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights is: "Individual Control: Consumers have a right to
exercise control over what personal data companies collect from them
and how they use it."'181 This discussion includes the principle that
consumers should be afforded "appropriate control" and that companies
"should offer consumers clear and simple choices, presented at times
and in ways that enable consumers to make meaningful decisions about
personal data collection, use, and disclosure."' 82 Further, this principle
requires that companies "should offer consumers means to withdraw or
limit consent that are as accessible and easily used as the methods for
granting consent in the first place."' 83 Thus, while not expressly
recommending an opt-in requirement, such a requirement would be
consistent with the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.
In 2014, the Editorial Board of the New York Times criticized the
Obama Administration and Congress for the failure to act on the 2012
Consumer Privacy report. 184  After noting that a new White House
consumer privacy report is expected in late April or early May 2014,185
178. WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 93.
179. Id. at 12.
180. The report notes that industry actors did create some self-regulatory opt-outs from targeted
advertising. Id. at 11-12.
181. Id. at App. A, at47.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id.
184. Editorial Board, A Second Front in the Privacy Wars, N.Y. TIMES Feb., 23, 2014
http://www.nytimes.comI2014/02/24/opinion/a-second-front-in-the-privacy-wars.htmlh.
185. John Podesta, Big Data and the Future of Privacy, www.whitehouse.gov, Jan. 23, 2014,
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the Times called for this report to provide "specific legislative proposals
to give consumers more control of [their] information."'8 6 The White
House issued its report on May 1, 2014 with policy recommendations,
including some specific legislative proposals. 187 Of particular relevance
to this Article, the White House report questions whether a notice and
consent based approach is the best method to protect privacy in the Big
Data era.'
88
Instead of focusing on collection, the report recommends that
focusing on "how data is used and reused would be a more productive
basis for managing privacy rights in a big data environment."'1 89  The
report focuses on use rather than collection because the authors do not
want to impede the use of Big Data for publicly beneficial purposes.
But, it also recognizes that "consumers still have a valid interest in 'Do
Not Track' tools that help them control when and how their data is
collected."' 90  Thus, the report is somewhat equivocal on the role of
consent.
There are at least two reasons why an opt-in requirement in the
commercial data processing context is an important part of the solution.
First, once data is collected, "it may prove impossible to make our data
disappear completely."' 91 Second, data collected by commercial data
processors is generally not used for publicly beneficial purposes; it is
used for private financial benefits.' 92  Thus, while focusing on use and
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/01/23/big-data-and-future-privacy.
186. Editorial Board, A Second Front in the Privacy Wars, N.Y. TIMES Feb., 23, 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/opinion/a-second-front-in-the-privacy-wars.html#.
187. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 16, at 58-68.
This report focuses on legal, ethical, and social norms that require consideration in light of big data
developments. A parallel White House privacy report was also issued on May 1, 2014. See
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS FOR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A
TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (May 1, 2014).
188. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 16, at 61
("While notice and consent remains fundamental in many contexts, it is now necessary to examine
whether a greater focus on how data is used and reused would be a more productive basis for managing
privacy rights in a big data environment."). For the reasons articulated here, receiving an individual's
opt-in consent, at least prior to processing by commercial actors, is an important mechanism because it
helps restore some balance between individuals and commercial actors by empowering individuals prior
to data collection.
189. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 16, at 61.
190. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 16, at 62.
191. Shaun Spencer, The Surviellance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65 S. CAR.
L. REV. 373, 400 (2013).
192. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1985) (credit
report is not a matter of public concern, it is "speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and
its specific business audience"); and Trans Union Corp. v. F.T.C., 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(Like the credit report in Dun & Bradstreet, "the information about individual consumers and their
credit performance communicated by Trans Union target marketing lists is solely of interest to the
company and its business customers and related to no matter of public concern.").
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reuse of collected data is a wise recommendation, the White House
report fails to sufficiently focus on preventing the collection of data
without consent and that failure is detrimental to individuals' privacy.
3. Opt-In Analysis in Data Privacy Cases
There is little case law on an opt-in requirement in the context of
online commercial data processors and the case law that exists does not
support requiring an opt-in mechanism before data processing. In U.S.
West, Inc. v. FCC,19 3 the Tenth Circuit analyzed an opt-in requirement
under the commercial speech doctrine and held that it violated the First
Amendment rights of the commercial actor. The FCC issued an order
requiring telecommunications services to receive a customer's opt-in
consent prior to using Customer Proprietary Information (CPNI) for
marketing purposes. CPNI includes sensitive information, "such as to
whom, where, and when a customer places calls."'19 4 The FCC
considered an opt-out approach, but chose an opt-in approach because of
privacy concerns of customers.
Although the court was skeptical that customer privacy in this context
was a substantial state interest, it accepted it as such for purposes of its
analysis. 195 The court, however, held that the FCC failed to establish
that the opt-in requirement directly and materially advanced the asserted
privacy interest 196 and that it failed to "adequately consider an obvious
and substantially less restrictive alternative, an opt-out strategy. 197 The
dissent disagreed noting that opt-outs are not as effective as opt-ins
when the goal is informed consent because opt-outs result in higher risks
of uninformed approval based on a failure to take action to opt-out.
198
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court considered an opt-in
requirement in the context of physicians' prescribing data. 199  A
Vermont law prohibited the sale, use, or disclosure of a physician's
prescribing data to pharmaceutical companies or their "detailers,"
200
193. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
194. Id. at 1235.
195. Id at 1236-37. The other asserted state interest was that an opt-in requirement promoted
competition, but that interest is not relevant here.
196. Id. at 182 F.3dat 1236.
197. Id. at 1238-39.
198. Id. at 1247 (Briscoe, J. dissenting).
199. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653. Sorrell is discussed in more detail in Part V.B and C,
below.
200. Pharmaceutical companies uses "detailers" to help increase sales of drugs. Detailers visit
physicians and bring drug samples and medical studies to persuade the doctor to prescribe particular
drugs. When a detailer knows a physician's prescribing history, it allows for a more effective pitch. Id.
at 2659-60. Because detailing is an expensive undertaking, "pharmaceutical companies most often use it
to promote high-profit brand-name drugs protected by patent." Id.
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unless the prescribing physician consented. In part, Vermont justified
this law as means to "protect medical privacy, including physician
confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-
patient relationship." 20 1 But, this law allowed the same information to
be used and disclosed to others, such as researchers, without requiring
the prescribing physician's consent. Because the Vermont law
disfavored pharmaceutical companies and was limited in its ability to
protect the asserted privacy interests, the Court held that the statute
violated their First Amendment rights. Thus, the opt-in consent
requirement did not save the statute. In a subsequent case, Knox v.
SEIU,20 2 the Court expressly required an opt-in approach as a matter of
First Amendment law. Because that case does not involve data privacy
it is not addressed here, but it is discussed in Part V. E, below.
4. The European Union's Proposed Opt-In Regime
The European Parliament recently proposed a General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). This proposed regulation is extensive,
including over 3000 proposed amendments. In addition to the extensive
length and scope of the regulation, the proposal is highly contentious,
including lobbying activity by U.S. data processing companies. This
Article focuses on the opt-in requirement of the proposed regulation,
which serves as the model for the type of opt-in requirement proposed
here.
The GDPR defines an individual's "consent" to data processing as
"any freely given, specific, informed and explicit indication.., either
by a statement or by a clear affirmative action. 20 3 The Regulation has
five conditions for consent. First, the data processor bears the burden of
proving that the individual provided consent.20 4 Second, consent to data
processing must be clearly "distinguishable in its appearance" from
consent to other matters. 20 5 This requirement seeks to avoid the problem
of hiding terms regarding data processing among other contractual
terms. Third, the individual must be provided with the right to withdraw
consent at any time.20 6 This right does not allow the individual to
retroactively revoke consent from previously consented-to data
201. Id. at 2667. Improving public health and reducing healthcare costs were the state interests
that Vermont asserted in support of the law. Id.
202. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
203. EU GDRP, supra note 22, at Comp. Art. 4(8).
204. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art. 7(1).
205. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art. 7(2).
206. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art. 7(3).
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processing.20 7 Fourth, "[c]onsent shall be purpose limited" and
automatically loses validity once the purpose is fulfilled or the use of the
data is no longer necessary for that purpose.20 8 Finally, "execution of a
contract or the provision of service shall not be made conditional on the
consent to the processing of data that is not necessary for the execution
of the contract or provision of the service. 20 9
Although the GDPR does not explicitly use the term "opt-in," its
definition of consent coupled with the conditions for valid consent show
that it does require opt-in consent before data processing may occur.
One of the recitals makes this point even clearer: "The use of default
options which the data subject is required to modify to object to the
processing, such as pre-ticked boxes, does not express free consent.,
210
In other words, an opt-out approach is not sufficient.
One commentator has noted that the United States and the European
Union are headed on "collision" course regarding privacy regulation.21'
Although the emphasis on conflict between EU and U.S. privacy law
represents the majority view, some commentators have argued that there
is more harmony between the U.S. and the EU's respective privacy law
regimes than is commonly acknowledged and that there is hope for more
harmony.212 While the EU's proposed GDPR generally supports the
view that EU and U.S. privacy law and policy are in conflict, there are
some signs of overlap, at least in the context of an opt-in requirement.
The FTC's 2012 Rapid Change report included some incremental
steps towards an opt-in regime, similar to that proposed by the EU. One
condition for consent under the EU's General Data Protection
Regulation is that the consent to data processing must be "clearly
distinguishable" from consent to other terms.213 The FTC provided an
example that is consistent with this EU condition.
Companies may seek "affirmative express consent" from consumers
by presenting them with a clear and prominent disclosure, followed by
the ability to opt in to the practice being described. Thus, for example,
requiring the consumer to scroll through a ten-page disclosure and click
on an "I accept" button would not constitute affirmative express
207. Id.
208. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art. 7(4).
209. Id.
210. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art. 7, Recital 33.
211. Paul M. Schwartz, Symposium: Privacy and Technology: The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A
Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013).
212. See generally, Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The New American Privacy, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 365
(2013); and Peter Swire, Peter Hustinx and Three Cliches about E.U-US. Data Privacy, DATA
PROTECTION ANNO 2014: HOW TO RESTORE TRUST? CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF PETER HUSTINX,
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR (2004-2014).
213. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art. 16(2).
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consent.
214
Another condition for consent under the EU's GDPR is that consent
to the transaction for the primary product or service cannot be
conditioned on consent to data processing that is unnecessary for the
underlying transaction. 215 The FTC made a similar recommendation, at
least for important services where individuals have few alternatives.
The FTC offered the provision of broadband services as one example of
an important service where individuals have few alternatives and
recommended that the provision of broadband services not be
conditioned on allowing the broadband service provider to track all of
the individual's online activity for marketing purposes.216 The FTC,
however, expressly limited its recommendation to "markets for
important services where consumers have few options. 217 The report
does not give examples of markets for "less important products or
services" where requiring consent to data processing may be tied to the
underlying transaction on a take it or leave it basis. A 2013 FTC report,
however, may shed some light on such an example.
The FTC's report, .com Disclosures: How to Make Effective
Disclosures in Digital Advertising, discusses the use of negative option
marketing, such as automatic enrollment in a cooking club with
purchase of a Dutch oven.218 Rather than recommend that negative
option marketing generally be replaced with an opt-in mechanism, the
report recommends improvements in disclosures of negative options.
One such improvement is that the individual must make an express
affirmative action, such as clicking a box to indicate assent, to be subject
to the negative option marketing. On first impression, this seems to be a
convoluted way of recommending an opt-in regime. The problem,
however, is the example in the report does not allow an individual to
purchase a Dutch oven without also accepting enrollment in the cooking
club. Perhaps this tie-in requirement is not particularly troubling in the
context of purchasing a Dutch oven. In the context of online privacy,
however, requiring consent to secondary data processing in order to
receive the primary service or good is troubling. As discussed above,
the EU's proposed GDPR would prohibit such tie-ins.
In conclusion, an opt-in requirement prior to data processing by
online commercial actors is a necessary nudge because these firms have
214. FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 21, at 57, n.274.
215. EU GDPR, supra note 22, at Comp. Art. 7(4).
216. FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 21, at 51-52.
217. Id. at 51.
218. FTC, .COM DIsCLOsuREs: How TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DisCLoSURES IN DIGITAL ADVERTISING
(March 2013), A-23-24, (2013), http'J/www.ftc.gov/sites/default/fileslattachments/press-releases/tc-staff-
revises-online-adverfising-disclosure-guidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf (hereinafter, FTC, .COM
DIscLosuREs).
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the natural financial incentive to continue engaging in intentionally
opaque data processing practices, practices that conflict with individual
privacy interests. Thus, before online commercial actors process data,
they must receive an individual's express, affirmative, and informed
consent. The EU's proposed GDPR provides a sound model for this
type of opt-in regime. In addition to the GDPR, Fair Information
Practice Principles dating back to 1973 include Choice/Consent as a
foundational principle and the FTC has issued several reports invoking
these principles. If Congress passes legislation that requires online
commercial data processors to receive an individual's affirmative,
express, and informed opt-in consent prior to data processing, First
Amendment challenges will surely follow. The next Part provides an
analysis of the constitutional permissibility of such an opt-in
requirement.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF AN OPT-IN REQUIREMENT
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, the Court set forth the test for determining
whether a regulation of commercial speech violates the First
Amendment. 219 The position of this Article is two-fold. First, an opt-in
requirement prior to data processing is constitutionally permissible
under a faithful application of the Central Hudson test, but the Court has
eroded the doctrine making it harder for a regulation of commercial
speech to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Second, even if the
Court would not uphold an opt-in requirement pursuant to the
commercial speech doctrine, there is another possible argument
supporting the constitutionality of an opt-in requirement. After
analyzing the commercial speech doctrine, I draw an analogy to Knox v.
SEIU, Local 1000.220 In Knox, the Court held that an opt-in mechanism
was constitutionally required by the First Amendment in the context of
extracting fees from non-members of public sector unions. Before
providing further analysis on these two issues, however, a debate about
the intersection of data processing and the First Amendment must be
noted.
A. Data Is Speech, At Least Sometimes
There is a debate whether data is speech subject to First Amendment
scrutiny.221 This debate remains unresolved in the courts because it has
219. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
220. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
221. Compare, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy & the First Amendment, 52
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not been fully litigated, even in cases where it seems that the question is
a threshold issue.222  Part of the debate involves distinguishing
information gathering from information.
Neil Richards has argued that information gathering is not subject to
First Amendment scrutiny because it is conduct, not speech.223 Richards
and others note that several laws involving speech do not raise First
Amendment scrutiny, such as certain criminal, securities, intellectual
property, sexual harassment, and labor laws.224 The Court similarly
observed that "it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed., 225  Like other laws that
involve a speech component, data processing is arguably conduct that is
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The view of data processing
as conduct not subject to the First Amendment, however, is not
universal.
Jane Bambauer has argued that data collection is speech subject to
First Amendment analysis because the reasoning in cases that draw a
distinction between information and information gathering is flawed.226
UCLA L. REV. 1149 (2005), with Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV.57 (2014).
Others argue that focusing on the policy choices regarding data privacy is more productive than
debating the proper categorization of data for First Amendment purposes. See Solove, Virtues of
Knowing Less, supra note 44, at 981; Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 6, at 1419-22. Neither Solove
nor Cohen reject the notion that First Amendment concerns are implicated by data privacy regulation.
222. Referring to U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) and United Reporting
Publ'g Corp. v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Los Angeles
Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999), Cohen expressed surprise that
"neither court (and, for that matter, none of the parties) question the presence of 'communication' at the
collection, processing, and exchange stages-a threshold requirement either for Central Hudson
scrutiny or for the stricter scrutiny that a narrowed conception of commercial speech might require."
See Cohen, Examined Lives, note 6, at 1413-14. Additionally, the Sorrell Court did not engage in any
analysis whether a physician's prescribing history data was speech.
223. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy & the First Amendment, supra note 221, at 1182-90; see
also Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America: How the Roberts Supreme Court is using the First
Amendment to craft a radical, free-market jurisprudence, DEMOCRACY, Issue No. 23, 51 (Winter 2012)
("The stranger and more innovative aspect of Sorrell [v. IMS Health] is that the case extended First
Amendment protection beyond anything recognizable as speech.... [M]ost of what the Vermont
decision protects is not verbal expression or even political spending but simply the sale of data."),
available at: http://www.democracyjoumal.org/pdf/23/theroberts-court vamerica.pdf .
224. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy & the First Amendment, supra note 221, at 1171 (citing
Kent Greenwalt, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 40, at 58, 79-140 (1989); Kent
Greenwalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081 (1983); Kent
Greenwalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645; Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of
the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional SaliencC, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765,
1777-84 (2004)).
225. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (quoting Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
226. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, supra note 221, at 61. Cf, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing
Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (Bhagwat contends that not only speech itself
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Bambauer supports her position, in part, by relying on a right to receive
information discussed in Virginia Pharmacy.227  I highlight reliance on
the right to receive information because a commercial data processor
could argue that such a right precludes an opt-in requirement prior to
data processing. As discussed below, however, the commercial speech
doctrine is primarily focused on the interests of the individual listener,
not the commercial speaker. 228 The right to receive information may be
a proxy for protecting individual and societal interests such that a
commercial speaker and individual listener may not have equivalent
rights to receive information in the commercial speech context.
229
In any case, asking whether data is speech is too broad of a
question,230 just as asking whether a blogger is a journalist for the
purpose of shield law protection is too broad of a question. Sometimes a
blogger should be afforded the protections of a shield law, despite not
satisfying the traditional notion of who qualifies as a "journalist.' 23'
Sometimes data is speech. More specifically, at least some aspects of
data processing involve speech subject to First Amendment scrutiny
because of the importance of the expressive value of the speech at issue,
while others do not.
If I send an email using Gmail, Google uses the content of my email
to target advertising at me and create a profile about me. Speech is
unquestionably involved (i.e. the words I typed into my email) and has
now been transformed into data "collected" by Google. The issue in this
instance does not seem to be whether data is speech because my email
has expressive value. Rather, it seems to be a question of whether
Google has the right to use the content of my email for purposes other
than transmitting the email to the intended recipient. Collecting my
geolocation data, however, seems to be conduct that might not qualify as
speech subject to First Amendment scrutiny because it "is not collected,
used or sold for its expressive content at all; it is a tool for processing
receives First Amendment protection, but also that conduct required to produce speech receives at least
some First Amendment protection).
227. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, supra note 221, at 74-75.
228. See Part V.B.2, below.
229. See Part, V.B.4, below.
230. See, Agatha Cole, Note, Internet Advertising After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discussion on
Data Privacy & the First Amendment, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 305 (2012) (Although a
broad interpretation of the Sorrell v. IMS Health majority could be read to mean that all data is speech,
"treating all data as speech seems overbroad and highly problematic.").
231. The Free Flow of Information Act of 2013 takes this categorical difficulty into account by
protecting not only a "covered journalist," but also allowing for judicial discretion to apply the
protections of the shield law to an individual who does not meet the definition of a "covered journalist,"
when "such protections would be in the interest ofjustice and necessary to protect lawful and legitimate
news-gathering activities under the specific circumstances of the case." S. 987, 113th Cong., 1 st Sess.
(as reported by S. Comm. On the Judiciary, Nov. 6, 2013).
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people, not a vehicle for injecting communication into the 'marketplace
of ideas."' 23
2
Without seeking to resolve the debate, this Article assumes that in at
least some instances, at least some data processing activities involve
speech subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Accepting some data
processing as subject to First Amendment analysis merits consideration
for the pragmatic reason that firms argue that regulation of information
that they collect and exchange interferes with their First Amendment
rights.2 3
3
Even assuming that some data processing is speech subject to First
Amendment scrutiny, the state "does not lose its power to regulate
commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a
component of that activity., 234 In the data processing context, speech is
a subordinate component to the firms' ultimate purpose, which is
financial gain from transactions in data.235 Thus, in addition to the
worthwhile debate and threshold issue regarding whether all data
processing activities are speech, it is also worthwhile to accept as a
premise that at least some data processing involves speech and consider
whether an opt-in requirement prior to commercial data processing is
constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment.
B. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
In 1942, the Supreme Court decided Valentine v. Chrestensen holding
that commercial speech did not receive First Amendment protection and
that prohibition or protection of commercial speech was a legislative
matter.236  Justice Douglas subsequently described the terse Valentine
decision as "casual, almost offhand. And, it has not survived
reflection. 237  In 1976, the Court decided Virginia State Pharmacy
232. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 6, at 1414.
233. Id. at 1375; U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1235, 1235 n. 7 (citing FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 28-29 (1997)); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations
Hiacked the First Amendment, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013)
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/1 13294/how-corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-
regulation.
234. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
235. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456-57 (noting that speech is subordinate to the pecuniary interest
that motivates in-person solicitation by a lawyer).
236. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
237. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) superseded
by statute, Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 29 U.S.C.S. § 162(e)(2) (Lexis), as recognized in
Cloud v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 613, 625 (1991). At least one aspect of Valentine has survived. In
Valentine, the Court held that the ban on commercial handbills could not be avoided by adding a non-
commercial message to the other side of the paper. 316 U.S. 52. Subsequent commercial speech cases
also state that application of the commercial speech doctrine cannot be avoided simply because the
commercial speech also includes speech involving an issue of public debate. Bolger v. Youngs Drug
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Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council holding that commercial
speech is entitled to limited First Amendment protection.238  While
Justice Stewart noted that Valentine had been "repeatedly questioned" in
the years leading up to Virginia Pharmacy,239 Justice Rehnquist believed
that Valentine was "constitutionally sound., 240 Rehnquist explained that
the "First Amendment speech provision, long regarded by this Court as
a sanctuary for expressions of public importance or intellectual interest,
is demeaned by invocation to protect advertisements of goods and
services. 241 Although Rehnquist's view on Valentine did not carry a
majority in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court has shared his view that
commercial speech is deserving of less protection than other types of
speech. I argue that properly understood, the commercial speech
doctrine can, and should, be applied to protect the privacy interests of
individuals against the data processing conduct of online commercial
data processors.
1. Defining Commercial Speech
One possible objection to applying the commercial speech doctrine to
data processing is that such activity does not fit within the definition of
"commercial speech." Case law and scholarship evince disagreement
and uncertainty as to the definition of "commercial speech., 242 The
Virginia Pharmacy Court, quoting an earlier case, defined commercial
speech as speech that "does no more than propose a commercial
transaction., 243  In Central Hudson, the Court defined commercial
Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475
(1989).
238. Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Prior to this decision, Martin Redish published an article that advocated for First Amendment protection
of commercial speech. Martin A. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEOWASH. L.REV. 429 (1971). Virginia Pharmacy
Board is consistent with much of Redish's analysis. At least a couple of student works preceded
Redish's article. See Tamara R. Piety, "A Necessary Cost of Freedom "? The Incoherence of Sorrell v.
IMS, 64 ALA. L. REv. 1, 19 & n. 95 (2012) (citing, Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial
Context, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1191 (1965); Comment, Developments in the Law, Deceptive Advertising,
80 HARV. L. REv. 1005 (1967)) [hereinafter The Incoherence of Sorrell].
239. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 776, n. 1 (Stewart, J., concurring) (string cite omitted).
240. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 405 (1977) (Rehnquist, J, dissenting) ("The
Valentine distinction was constitutionally sound and practically workable, and I am still unwilling to
take even one step down the 'slippery slope' away from it.").
241. Bates, 433 U.S. at 404 (1977) (Rehnquist, J, dissenting).
242. E.g., Bemstein & Lee, Where the Consumer is the Commodity, supra note 2, at 61; Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between commercial and
non-commercial speech.") (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 523 n. 4 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
243. See Virginia Pharmacy, 468 U.S. at 762, 771 n. 24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
2014]
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
speech as speech that relates "solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience. 244  These are narrow definitions of
commercial speech.245 They fail to capture the full scope of speech that
ought to be analyzed under the commercial speech doctrine. One reason
for this narrow scope of commercial speech as defined by the Court may
be that it is a product of the cases before the Court.2 4 6  Additionally,
those cases involved older technologies and, therefore, do not reflect a
consideration of the limits of what constitutes modem commercial
speech.
Erin Bernstein and Theresa Lee raise two points relevant to
reconsideration of the scope of the commercial speech definition. First,
Bolger v Youngs Drug Prod Corp.247 is notable because it found that
"speech not directly proposing a commercial transaction should be
analyzed under the commercial speech doctrine. 248  Second, the
definition of commercial speech must be expanded to include the
interaction between a data processor and an individual, even when the
individual is using the online service for "free., 249 This expansion of the
scope of the commercial speech doctrine is not radical. 250  "The
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
244. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64
(1977); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979)).
245. Victor Brudney, The First Amendment & Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REv. 1153, 1155
(2012); but see Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (the "solely
related to the economic interests" definition is "unquestionably too broad" because it includes speech
entitled to full First Amendment protection.).
246. Steven Shi ffrin, The First Amendment & Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 N.W. U. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1984). In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, the Court
had an opportunity to consider whether the definition of commercial speech was broad enough to cover
corporate speech regarding a matter of public debate. 539 U.S. 654, 657 (2003). Allegedly, Nike made
false statements regarding its labor practices and conditions in its manufacturing facilities. The
California Supreme Court held that such speech qualified as commercial speech, even if such speech
also played a role in public debate about Nike's labor practices and conditions. 27 Cal. 4th 939, 969
(2002). The Court granted certiorari, however, it subsequently issued a per curiam opinion holding that
certiorari had been improvidently granted. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented on the
ground that the scope of commercial speech is an important First Amendment issue that the Court
should have addressed. Kasky, 539 U.S. at 683-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For commentary on Nike v.
Kasky, see generally, Symposium: Nike v. Kasky & The Modem Commercial Speech Doctrine, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 965 (2004).
247. 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
248. Bernstein & Lee, Where the Consumer is the Commodity, supra note 2, at 47. The Court
found that the "combination" of three factors made the informational pamphlets at issue subject to the
commercial speech doctrine: (I) a concession by the speaker that the pamphlets were advertisements;
(2) the fact that the pamphlets referenced a specific product; and (3) the fact that the pamphlet provider
had an economic motivation for distributing them. Bolger, 436 U.S. at 66-67. The Court expressly
stated that none of these three factors alone would be sufficient to invoke review under the commercial
speech doctrine. Id.
249. Bernstein & Lee, Where the Consumer is the Commodity, supra note 2, at 75.
250. A radical proposal is that "commercial speech" should cover everything that "for-profit
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leveraging of consumer data to sell advertisements or aggregate data is
surely as much of a commercial enterprise as providing '(X) good or
service at (Y) price.' 251 However, some question whether the category
of commercial speech should be maintained at all, let alone expanded.
Several Justices have expressed concern that truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech does not receive the same protection as non-
commercial speech.252 Commentators have asserted that distinguishing
between commercial and non-commercial speech "makes no sense. 253
Another commentator believes that increasing media convergence and
the rise of user-generated content create practical and principled
problems in maintaining a dichotomy between commercial and non-
commercial speech.254 To be sure, distinguishing commercial speech
from other fully protected speech is sometimes complex. 255 But, it is not
an impossible task. Indeed, making such distinctions is how lawyers
and judges earn their keep.
As Bernstein and Lee noted, the creation of profiles and online
behavioral advertising by commercial actors are no less commercial
than a pharmacy advertising drug prices. In both instances, the
commercial activities are motivated by economic gain.256 As Thomas
entities say, because no matter how it appears, no matter what communicative form it assumes,
communications by for-profit entities are always and essentially promotional and hence 'commercial,'
because for-profit corporations have no other purpose for being under the law (at least in the United
States under current law)." TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 12 (2012). Piety's proposal is radical in the sense that it deviates significantly
from the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence, not that it is an unreasonable proposal.
251. Bernstein & Lee, Where the Consumer is the Commodity, supra note 2, at 76 (citing David F.
McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 359, 401 (1990)). Bernstein
and Lee further support the modest nature of their proposal by drawing an analogy to courts finding that
clickwrap and even browsewrap agreements as enforceable contracts. Courts would not find these to be
enforceable if no value was exchanged. Id. at 77-78.
252. Lorrilard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 571-72 (Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 432-38
(1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see, Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (does not believe Central Hudson involved "commercial speech"); and Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493-97 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
253. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
628 (1990).
254. Adam Theier, Advertising, Commercial Speech, and First Amendment Parity, 5
CHARLESTON L. REV. 503, 506 (2011).
255. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
256. While financial motivation alone cannot dispositively establish speech as commercial, by
definition, the economic incentive of the speaker must be a factor. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67. In addition
to Bolger, other Supreme Court commercial speech decisions show that the economic motivation of a
speaker is a relevant factor identifying and analyzing commercial speech. E.g., In Re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978); and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
In Ohralik, the Court upheld a ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers because the pecuniary incentive
created a risk to substantial state interests in protecting privacy and preventing undue influence. Ohralik,
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Emerson noted, changing societal conditions require reconsideration of
existing law regarding free expression.257 If the current definition of
commercial speech does not include data processing by commercial
actors, then the definition ought to be expanded to include this
substantial area of our information economy,258 especially when
considering the original purpose of the commercial speech doctrine.
2. Purpose of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The Virginia Pharmacy Court did not protect commercial speech for
the purpose of protecting the commercial speaker's interest in financial
gain. Rather, commercial speech was protected for individual and
societal interests in facilitating the ability of individuals to make
informed decisions and improve competition in the marketplace. 259 In
assessing the validity of a commercial speech regulation the Court
stated, "The listener's interest in substantial., 260 But, not all commercial
speech furthers these individual and societal interests. Two examples
help illustrate this point.
First, not all commercial speech is informational. The speech in
Virginia Pharmacy is a quintessential example of purely informational
speech. The Court described the speech as, "I will sell you the X
prescription drug at the Y price.'261 Purely informational speech serves
the individual and societal interests underlying the commercial speech
doctrine. Propaganda or persuasive speech, however, may actually harm
these interests. Although there is no clear line between purely
informational speech and propaganda, that is not a reason for the law to
decline to acknowledge these as distinct points on a continuum and seek
to craft legal standards that do not equate commercial speech with core
First Amendment speech.262
436 U.S. at 449, 461-62. In Primus, the Court noted the lack of pecuniary gain as a relevant factor in
prohibiting the suppression of speech by an attorney soliciting pregnant mothers on public assistance in
South Carolina that were sterilized or being threatened with sterilization. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 422.
The Court applied "exacting" scrutiny because the speech in this case involved "core First Amendment
rights." Id. at 432. The Primus Court noted that the purpose or motive of the speaker is relevant in a
commercial speech analysis, even though such analysis is not normally at the center of First Amendment
analysis. Id. at 438, n.2.
257. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
894-95 (1963).
258. For an early scholarly exploration of the implications of the information economy on privacy
rights, see e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 192 (1992).
259. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
260. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
261. Virginia Pharmacy, 468 U.S. at 761.
262. See, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) ("We have always been
careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment's core.").
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Second, sometimes the method in which commercial speech is
received may be counterproductive to the individual and societal
interests that the commercial speech doctrine seeks to protect. As the
Court has stated, "the mode of communication makes all the
,,263264difference. ' 63  In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, a newspaper
advertisement displaying prices for routine legal services received First
Amendment protection. In Ohralik v. State Bar Association,
265
however, an in-person solicitation by a lawyer while the potential client
was in the hospital immediately after a car accident crossed the line.
The Court viewed this method of solicitation as overreaching and not
protected by the First Amendment. In addition to overreaching, the
Court was concerned that an in-person solicitation presented unique
regulatory challenges because it is "not visible or open to public
scrutiny., 266 Thus, in-person solicitation "actually may disserve the
individual and societal interests, identified in Bates, in facilitating
'informed and reliable decision-making."'
267
Data processing is somewhat analogous to in-person solicitation
because firms' data processing practices are not visible or open to public
scrutiny. Individuals generally do not know what information is being
collected, how it's used, or with whom its shared. Online behavioral
advertising raises similar concerns as in-person solicitation.
Commercial actors are targeting specific advertisements at specific
individuals based on profiles and may be viewed as overreaching,
especially when they use these profiles to engage in price discrimination
263. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475 (1988) (holding that a ban on all direct
mail solicitation by lawyers violated the First Amendment). Although Shapero does not find targeting
advertisements via mail problematic, it could not have foreseen the exponential advances in a
commercial actor's ability to target individuals. Thus, while Shapero must be addressed in assessing the
legitimacy of an opt-in requirement, it should not be viewed as dispositive because it could not have
foreseen the unique challenges of online data processing in 1988. See Part ILA, above.
264. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
265. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
266. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641
(1985) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466).
267. Ohralik, 436 U.S. 444, 457-58 (1978). In Edenfield v. Fane, the Court held a Florida statute
prohibiting in-person solicitation by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) as unconstitutional in
violation the First Amendment. 507 U.S. 761 (1993). On the surface, Edenfield may suggest that in-
person solicitation itself is not problematic and therefore provide a counterpoint to my argument that
data processing is problematic because it is somewhat analogous to in-person solicitation. Edenfield is
distinguishable for two reasons. First, Florida failed to provide evidence of actual harm caused by in-
person solicitations by CPAs. As set forth in this Article, there is evidence of harm. See Part ILA, above,
and IV.B.6, below. Second, the Court noted that the in-person solicitations occurred at the business
offices of sophisticated listeners, and only if they agreed to the solicitation. Data processing is
fundamentally different because it involves less sophisticated parties and intrudes further into an
individual's life than an infrequent solicitation by a CPA at the solictee's business office.
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or other activities that are harmful to individuals. 268  An opt-in
requirement helps remedy the lack of transparency and overreaching.
While online behavioral advertising is not as intrusive as when a
lawyer seeks to solicit an accident victim in the hospital, online
behavioral advertising is not as innocuous as the newspaper
advertisement upheld in Bates. In the commercial speech context, the
Court has noted that "an untargeted letter mailed to society at large is
different in kind from a targeted solicitation., 269 Additionally, the FTC
has recognized the detrimental aspects of in-person solicitation in the
context of ordinary consumer products, 270 as well as the detrimental
aspects of online data processing. 271  To the extent that online
commercial data processing disserves the individual and societal
interests in fostering informed and reliable decision-making, such
activity may be regulated commercial speech. Or, at least such speech is
not supported by the original purpose of the commercial speech
doctrine.
In the attorney speech context and beyond, several Supreme Court
commercial speech decisions have been sensitive to the medium of
communication in analyzing the permissibility of the regulation. On
numerous occasions, the Court has expressly excluded "electronic
broadcast media" from the scope of its decisions because of the "special
problems" created by this technology.272 As set forth in Part II and as
acknowledged by the Supreme Court,2 73 online data processing raises
unique and unresolved challenges to individual privacy interests. Thus,
while prior commercial speech case law in the offline context is relevant
in analyzing the permissibility of an opt-in requirement for online data
processing, the Court has expressly left open the possibility that
different technology platforms may require different commercial speech
268. See also, Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery at 34 (2013) (Without
identifying the specific cause(s), Sweeny's study found that "[a] greater percentage of ads having
'arrest' in ad text appeared for black identifying first names than for white identifying first names in
searches on Reuters.com, on Google.com, and in subsets of the sample."), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2208240.
269. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 630. In a prior case, the Court held that targeted
mailings alone are an insufficient reason to suppress commercial speech. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988). Shapero is distinguishable because online data processing is not
functionally identical to an isolated mailing sent to an individual whose home is in foreclosure. See Part
I, above.
270. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
271. See Part II, above, and accompanying notes.
272. Virginia Pharmacy, 468 U.S. at 773; Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 576
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); Zauderer 471 U.S. at 673, n. I (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part) (noting that neither the majority nor her and
those joining her opinion express any views on whether the rule announced for attorney advertising in
newspapers applies to electronic broadcast media).
273. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
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rules.274
An opt-in requirement is consistent with the purpose of protecting
individuals' interests in the commercial speech context. Data processors
have an economic incentive not to be forthcoming about their data
processing practices or to provide an individual the ability to opt-out, let
alone offer an opt-in approach. Individuals are not well situated to force
such disclosures.275 In other words, there is a market failure, in large
part, because of substantial information asymmetry and power
discrepancy. When markets fail, government regulation is a traditional
response.276  A legislatively required opt-in mechanism prior to data
processing is such a response and it serves the purpose of the
commercial speech doctrine because it protects individual and societal
interests in the context of commercial activity.
3. Justifications for Limited First Amendment Protection
The Court did not simply state that the purpose of the commercial
speech doctrine was to protect individual and societal interests. It also
provided two primary justifications for why commercial speech could
withstand less than full First Amendment protection. First, commercial
speech is more durable than other speech because it is the result of the
economic interests of the commercial actor.277 Speech motivated by
financial gain is less likely to be chilled than other speech.278 Second,
commercial speech does not need as much protection as other speech
because truth is more readily verifiable by the seller of goods or services
than speech in non-commercial contexts. 279 These justifications are not
without detractors.
Some commercial speech, such as the health effects of eggs, may be
less verifiable than political speech by a candidate, such as the truth
about his past.280  Some non-commercial speech may be as hardy as or
274. Not all Justices agree that the First Amendment protections may vary based on the
technology used to communicate speech. See e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
530-35 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
275. Bernstein & Lee, Where the Consumer is the Commodity, supra note 2, at 67.
276. SIDNEY SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF
PROGRESSIVE REGULATION xiii (2014).
277. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772, n. 24; Bates, 433 U.S. at 771-72; Cent. Hudson, 447
U.S. at 564, n. 6; Fox, 492 U.S. at 482.
278. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772, n. 24; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, n. 6.; Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (speech "solely motivated by the
desire for profit.., is a force less likely to be deterred than others.").
279. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 777-78 (Stewart, J., concurring); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
280. Daniel Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372,
385-86 (1979); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
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hardier than commercial speech, such as religious speech.281 These
critiques of the justifications for affording commercial speech with less
than full First Amendment protection are not unwarranted. Modem
advertising techniques have gone far beyond merely providing purely
informational speech, such as the prices of drugs at issue in Virginia
Pharmacy.282 History shows that religious speech is at least as hardy as
commercial speech, if not more, and it is provided full First Amendment
protection. But, even if these justifications for affording commercial
speech less protection are wanting, that does not prove that commercial
speech should be afforded full First Amendment protection.
First, that advertising techniques have gone far beyond the simple
provision of factual information actually supports limited First
Amendment protection of commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy
protected purely informational speech, the price of drugs. It did not
address speech that aims to persuade. Justice Rehnquist worried about
the ramifications of Virginia Pharmacy on commercial speech that aims
to persuade.283 He worried that Virginia Pharmacy would be used to
extend First Amendment protection to such speech. Because of the vast
information asymmetry between individuals and data processors,
individuals are at risk of manipulation, especially when professional
marketers engage in speech aimed to persuade.284
Second, the critique of the durability justification does not disprove
the durability of commercial speech; it merely shows that other speech
may be as durable or more durable. Even accepting this critique, it does
not prove that commercial speech is entitled to full First Amendment
protection. For example, religious freedom is expressly protected by the
Constitution, unlike commercial speech, and that may be a reason for
not affording commercial speech full First Amendment protection, even
though religious speech is equally or more durable. Similarly, there is
near universal agreement that the First Amendment protects political
speech. Even though commercial speech may be no less durable than
political or religious speech, commercial speech does not share the
historical or textual protection afforded to these speech categories.
Another justification provided by the Court for limiting the First
Amendment protection afforded to commercial speech goes to First
Amendment theory and jurisprudence. A common theory that has been
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U.L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1983); Kozinksi & Banner, Who's
Afraid of Commercial Speech?, supra note 253, at 637.
281. Kozinksi & Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, supra note 253, at 637; Martin
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv.591, 633 (1982).
282. Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, supra note 253, at 635-36.
283. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 788 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
284. See e.g., Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 2.
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recognized in Supreme Court case law is that the solution to problematic
speech is more speech.285 In the commercial speech context, however,
the Court has recognized that the theory does not work in practice.286
4. Whose Right to Receive Information?
The commercial speaker's right to receive information is a novel
question in the commercial speech context. Virginia Pharmacy focused
on the public's right to receive information about drug prices; it does not
address the commercial speaker's right to receive information. 287  An
opt-in requirement does not keep the public ignorant. To the contrary,
an opt-in requirement supports the public's right to receive information
by alerting consumers as to how their personal data can be used. The
holding in Virginia Pharmacy should not be twisted into an argument
that an opt-in requirement violates a commercial actor's right to receive
information because the right of the commercial actor to receive
information is not equivalent to the public's right to receive information
in the commercial speech context. Indeed, the reasoning of Virginia
Pharmacy where the Court overturned a speech suppressing law actually
supports the Vermont law overturned in Sorrell, even though that law
suppressed information.
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court protected the commercial speech at
issue by citing the citizen-consumer's right to receive information.
288
The Court reasoned that suppressing the price of drugs has the most
detrimental effect on vulnerable populations, such as the poor, the sick
and elder populations.289 The Court was concerned that the advertising
ban created risks of excessive prices and inferior service because it kept
"citizens" ignorant.290
The concern regarding protecting vulnerable populations also arises
in Sorrell. The Vermont law sought to protect patients from the effects
285. See e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
286. Obralik, 436 U.S. at 457; Cent. Hudson, 447 at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
287. Other commercial speech cases also focus on the public's right to receive information. E.g.
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 79 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996). Further, non-commercial speech cases also focus on the public's right to
receive information. See e.g. Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the
listeners and viewers that is paramount, not the broadcasters"); and, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 409-10 (1974) (prison rules restricting inmate correspondence abridged non-inmate recipients'
First Amendment rights).
288. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57. Rehnquist disputed that the case centered on the
listener's right to receive information. He viewed the issue as the right of a party to publish information.
Id. at 782.
289. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
290. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769.
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of pharmaceutical companies "hawking" 291 their higher-priced brand-
name drugs as alternatives to generics and the risk of physicians
overprescribing drugs.2 92  Patients being prescribed drugs are a
vulnerable population because they do not have the expertise of the
prescribing physicians, they are not privy to the marketing
communications that the physicians hear, and they do not have the data
that the detailers or pharmaceutical companies use to craft their pitch.
Thus, in the commercial speech context, a commercial speaker's right to
receive information should be viewed as a subordinate concern when
compared to the interests in protecting citizens.
Despite Sorrell (and Citizens United v. FEC293), the identity of the
party is (or should be) relevant when analyzing the right to receive
information, at least in the commercial speech context. Indeed, the
Court has expressly stated that the identity of the parties matter when
analyzing whether a ban on in-person solicitation is a constitutional
regulation of commercial speech.294 And, suppression of information
alone is an insufficient factor to assess the validity of a commercial
speech regulation.
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court was concerned that too little
information in the hands of the listening public would be detrimental to
their interests in being able to make informed decisions regarding drug
prices. In Sorrell, Vermont was concerned that too much information in
the possession of speakers motivated primarily or "purely '295 by
economic gain would be detrimental to the interests of patients being
prescribed drugs. By prohibiting detailers and pharmaceutical
companies from receiving prescribing physicians' data, Vermont was
not seeking suppress information from citizen-consumers. Vermont was
291. Justice Rehnquist did not believe that the Founding Fathers would have viewed regulation of
economic activity, including advertising, as beyond the scope of state regulation:
Nor do I think those who won our independence, while declining to 'exalt order at the cost of
liberty,' would have viewed a merchant's unfettered freedom to advertise in hawking his wares
as a 'liberty' not subject to extensive regulation in light of the government's substantial interest
in attaining 'order' in the economic sphere.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 595 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
292. The Court described "detailing" as "an expensive undertaking, so pharmaceutical companies
most often use it to promote high-profit brand-name drugs protected by patent." Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at
2660.
293. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Citizens United held that
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act violated the First Amendment rights of corporations and unions
because it discriminated based on the identity of the speaker in the context of political speech. Id. at 341.
294. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774; see also, Went For It, 515 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Speech has the capacity to covey complex substance, yielding various insights and interpretations
depending upon the identity of the listener or the reader and the context of its transmission.").
295. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court assumed that the "advertisers interest is a purely economic
one." 425 U.S. at 762.
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seeking to further the interests that supported Virginia Pharmacy.
Namely, Vermont was seeking to avoid excessive charges and inferior
service that would result from doctors prescribing higher priced name-
brand drugs instead of generic alternatives and overprescribing drugs.
In sum, neither the right to receive information nor the suppression of
information in the abstract is the sine qua non of commercial speech
analysis. The sine qua non is the public interest.296 While the right to
receive information and the suppression of information are factors in
determining the public interest in commercial speech, another important
factor in commercial speech analysis is whether the regulation seeks to
keep the public in the dark.297 In Virginia Pharmacy, the law kept the
public ignorant about drug prices, which operated to their detriment. In
Sorrell, the law was intended to keep the commercial actor in the dark
regarding a physician's prescribing practices to prevent the economic
actor from taking advantage of information to the possible harm of the
patient merely because it is in the commercial actor's economic interests
to do so. As the Sorrell Court noted, in the medical profession and more
generally, "information is power." 298  Because the interests of the
commercial speaker are not at the core of commercial speech doctrine, it
is at least an open question whether keeping the commercial actor in the
dark raises the same concerns as keeping the public ignorant of
information.
As Ryan Calo has observed in the behavioral economics context,
information has played a variety of roles in human history. Information
has been the hero, the villain, and most recently, the victim.299  In the
commercial speech context, the complex nature of information should
not be overlooked. The identity of the party being denied information
should play a role in assessing the validity of a regulation that keeps a
party in the dark because an individual-listener's interest in receiving
information is not equivalent to a commercial-speaker's interest.
296. In Virginia PharmacyPublic Citizen argued that commercial speech merited constitutional
protection to the extent that it benefited the public. Brief of Appellees, Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 1975 WL 173826, *10 (1975) (The public have "an
independent right to receive drug information which is not derivative from the rights of speakers to
disseminate that information."). See also Haley Sweetland Edwards, The Corporate "Free Speech"
Racket: How corporations are using the First Amendment to destroy government regulation, WASH.
MONTHLY (January/February 2014).
297. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503 ("The First Amendment directs us to be especially
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be
their own good."); Id. at 526 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens
by keeping them ignorant are impermissible.").
298. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671 (quoting a Vermont physician).
299. Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 1012-14. Information can be a villain
because of information overload, a hero because more information can lead to better choices, and a
victim because of the privacy intrusions caused by Big Data. Id.
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5. Disclosure Laws versus Speech Suppressing Laws
A disclosure requirement is a necessary component of an opt-in
regime that aims to allow for informed consent. Early in the Court's
commercial speech jurisprudence, it recognized the possibility that a
disclosure requirement might be necessary in some instances to prevent
consumers from being misled.300  Not long thereafter, in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,30 1 the
Court upheld a disclosure requirement in the context of attorney
advertising. The Court held that a disclosure need only be "reasonably
related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.
30 2
This holding appears to create an even lower threshold for
commercial speech regulation requiring a disclosure, as opposed to
Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny standard when the law imposes
a prohibition on speech.30 3 In upholding the disclosure requirement, the
Zauderer Court noted that its commercial speech jurisprudence has
consistently viewed disclosure requirements as a less restrictive
alternative to suppressing speech altogether. 304 The Court reasoned that
a lower threshold for disclosure requirements is warranted because a
commercial speaker has "substantially weaker" First Amendment
interests in being compelled to disclose truthful information than in
being suppressed from speaking. 30 5 This view is particularly true in the
commercial speech context where the commercial actor is simply
required to disclose verifiable information about its product or service to
avoid consumer deception or overreaching.30 6 At least one Justice
believed that disclosure requirements do not even involve the
commercial speech doctrine because laws that seek to protect
"consumers from incomplete information" are permissible. 30 7 And in
Sorrell, one reason Justice Breyer dissented from the Court's use of
"heightened" scrutiny was because the Vermont law did not require or
300. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
301. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 466
(1985).
302. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. The specific requirement upheld was the disclosure that in a
contingency fee arrangement, the client may be responsible for costs, even if the case is lost. Id. at 652.
303. Id. In his Zauderer concurrence, Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall, stated that
disclosure requirements should be subject to the same level of review as commercial speech regulations
that prohibit speech. Id.at 657-58 & n. I (Brennan, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, dissenting in part).
304. Id. at651,n. 14.
305. Id. at 651, n.14; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,203 (1982).
306. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, n.14 ("The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge
accurate information regarding his services is not such a fundamental right.").
307. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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forbid the detailers or pharmaceutical companies saying anything.30 8
A disclosure requirement as to what data is collected, how it's used,
and with whom it's shared is directly related to informing consumers
and is reasonably related to preventing consumer deception. Of course,
there could be a disclosure requirement without an opt-in feature, if the
Court or Congress viewed disclosure of data processing practices as
sufficient to protect the individual's interests. Because an opt-in regime
seeks to do more than simply prevent individuals from being misled,
however, providing consumers the option to refuse to consent to data
processing is essential. In addition to preventing individuals from being
misled as to a commercial actor's data processing practices, an opt-in
requirement protects the privacy interests set forth in Part II, helps
prevent the commodification of human beings, and avoid other harms
such as price discrimination, and adverse insurance or employment
decisions based on statistical inferences.
6. Applying Central Hudson to an Opt-In Requirement
Once speech has been deemed "commercial speech," the Court must
consider whether a regulation of that speech violates the First
Amendment. In Central Hudson, the Court set forth a four-part test to
make this determination. First, the speech must "at least concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. 30 9 Second, the government interest
supporting the regulation of the speech must be "substantial. 3 °10 Third,
the Court analyzes whether the regulation "directly advances" the
governmental interest.311  Finally, the regulation must not be "more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.",
312
Subsequent to Central Hudson, the Court clarified the contours of the
third and fourth factors. The third factor means that the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest in a "material way.",3 13 The
fourth factor does not require that the regulation be the "least restrictive"
means for serving the interest.314 Rather, there must be a "reasonable
fit" between the regulation and the interest served.31 5 In other words,
the Central Hudson test is one of intermediate, not strict scrutiny.31 6
308. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting).




313. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
314. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476 (1989) (the fourth-prong of
Central Hudson "requires something short of a least-restrictive-means standard.").
315. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
316. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995).
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Some Justices have questioned whether intermediate scrutiny is
sufficient protection for truthful, non-misleading commercial speech.317
Under a faithful application of the Central Hudson test, legislation
requiring data processors to receive an individual's express, affirmative,
and informed opt-in consent prior to data processing should survive First
Amendment review. First, while there could be debate about whether
data processors engage in misleading behavior in the ways they process
data, such as hidden web bugs or intentionally opaque terms of service, I
do not engage in that analysis here. Data processing is presumed lawful
and non-misleading for purposes of this Article.
Second, several state interests that the Court has accepted as
substantial are applicable to an opt-in requirement. Protecting
individual privacy is a substantial interest. 318 Although the Sorrell Court
rejected the argument that a purpose of the Vermont law was to protect
individual privacy, it stated: "Privacy is a concept too integral to the
person and a right too essential to freedom to allow its manipulation to
support just those ideas the government prefers." 319 In the context of in-
person solicitations by lawyers shortly after an accident, the Court noted
that uninvited solicitations may "distress the solicited simply because of
their obtrusiveness and the invasion of individual privacy, even when no
other harm materializes. '320 Unconsented-to data processing invades
privacy because of the creation of profiles and tracking of individual's
internet activity. Online behavioral advertising can also be described as
an uninvited and obtrusive solicitation that invades individual privacy.
If the reasoning in Ohralik is applied in this context, then it is not
necessary to identify other harms because individual privacy is a
substantial state interest and the intrusiveness of unconsented-to data
processing invades that interest. But, there are other harms that the
Court has acknowledged as substantial state interests worthy of
protection in the commercial speech context.
Preventing undue influence, overreaching, and misrepresentation are
all substantial state interests, according to the Court.32' Solicitations can
be regulated to protect individuals from such risks.322 Many of the
Court's solicitation cases acknowledge the special concerns that arise
when an attorney uses his "professional expertise to overpower the will
317. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); Lorillard
Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(conceding that Central Hudson imposes an intermediate scrutiny standard, but stating that strict
scrutiny should apply to all truthful "commercial" speech).
318. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 432; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461; Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 769.
319. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672.
320. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465-66.
321. Bates, 433 U.S. at 366; In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 432; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462.
322. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462.
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and judgment of lay people who have not sought their advice. 323
Similar concerns arise in the context of data processing because
advertisers are seeking to use their professional expertise in the "art of
persuasion"324 to overcome the will of lay people that have not chosen to
be targeted or profiled. An opt-in requirement helps ameliorate these
risks.
One final state interest recognized by the Court may be extrapolated
to the data processing context: commercial exploitation of individuals.
In Fox, the Court held that commercial exploitation of college students
was a substantial state interest.325 This state interest could be expanded
to apply to data processing, regardless of whether one is a college
student. An opt-in requirement helps avoid the commercial exploitation
of individuals in a situation of great information asymmetry and power
disparity.
Third, in establishing that the regulation advances the state interest in
a direct and material way, the government "must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree." 326 Although the government must do more than
provide a conclusory assertion that the regulation will directly and
materially advance the state interest, it need not prove actual harm, nor
provide empirical evidence. 327  Prophylactic rules to prevent harms
stemming from solicitation are permissible. 328  Because an opt-in
requirement is a prophylactic rule designed to prevent harm before it
occurs, proof of actual harm should not be required. With that said,
there is proof of harm resulting from data processing beyond the
obtrusive nature of uninvited solicitations.
323. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, dissenting in part); Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474 ("The relevant inquiry is... whether the mode of
communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility [to undue
influence].").
324. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 775 (noting that a CPA, unlike a lawyer, is not a "professional trained
in the art of persuasion). Like lawyers, however, online advertisers that use profiles to target advertising
at individuals are trained in the art of persuasion. See generally, PACKARD, HIDDEN PERSUADERS, supra
note 15; and, TUROW, DAILY YOU, supra note 4.
325. Fox, 492 U.S. at 475.
326. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71.
327. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 555.
328. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464. Although Edenfield, limited the application of prophylactic rules
to regulate commercial speech, it did not prohibit them. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774-76. In Edenfield,
the Court struck down Florida's prohibition on in-person solicitation by certified public accountants
because no studies or anecdotal evidence was submitted. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771. In Florida Bar v.
Went For It, the Court upheld the Florida Bar's ban on direct mail solicitation of personal injury or
wrongful death clients within 30 days of the accident. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). Unlike the lack of evidence
in Edenfield, the Florida Bar provided a 106-page summary based on a two year study regarding the
effects of lawyer advertising on public opinion of the profession and significant anecdotal evidence.
Went for It, 515 U.S. at 626-28.
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There is evidence to support that an opt-in regime will advance the
privacy interests of individuals. Consumer survey studies by Joseph
Turow and others show a clear consumer preference for less uninvited
data processing. 329 Starting over fifteen years ago, the FTC has issued
multiple reports regarding online privacy concerns raised by online data
processing. In 2012, the White House issued its privacy bill of rights in
response to online privacy concerns. In 2013, a Senate Subcommittee
Report concluded data processing without consent will continue if the
status quo is maintained. 330 An opt-in requirement directly advances
these privacy interests in a material way because it empowers the
individual to make an express, affirmative, and informed choice about
whether to forego her privacy prior to data processing. An opt-in
requirement helps restore at least some information symmetry in the
interaction between the individual and the data processor. Currently,
data processors are incentivized to be less than forthcoming in their data
processing practices and to make it difficult to opt-out, if there is any
option at all.
Under the final prong of the Central Hudson test, the regulation need
not be the least restrictive means. Rather, it must be a "reasonable fit"
between interests being protected and the means of protecting them.
There is a reasonable fit between the privacy interests and an opt-in
requirement. A necessary component of an opt-in regime is a disclosure
requirement. The disclosure requirement must inform individuals about
the firm's data processing practices. In analyzing commercial speech
regulations, the Court has stated that disclosure requirements are often
noted as being a less restrictive regulation than a prohibition on
speech.331
Moreover, an opt-in requirement is not a complete ban on data
processing. An opt-in requirement merely requires that data processors
receive meaningful consent from an individual before engaging in data
processing. If an individual prefers to receive behavioral advertising or
believes that profiles created by data aggregators inure to her benefit,
then such a choice is perfectly legal under this proposal. In other words,
an opt-in requirement is a nudge that seeks to respect the probable
preferences of individuals, while still allowing data processing to occur
after the commercial actor receives the individual's meaningful consent.
An opt-in requirement should pass constitutional muster under the
329. Josepi Turow, et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising & Three Activities that Enable
It, Sept. 29, 2009, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=1478214.
330. SENATE COMM. REPORT, supra note 124, at 35.
331. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, n. 14 ("all our discussions of restraints on commercial speech
have recommended disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual
suppression of speech.").
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Central Hudson formulation of the commercial speech doctrine.
C. Erosion and Inversion of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
At the same time that advertising is increasingly permeating our
lives, 332 the Court has eroded the ability of the commercial speech
doctrine to regulate economic activity that has (at least ostensibly) a
speech component.333 Some lament this erosion, while others celebrate
it arguing that the Court has not gone far enough until commercial
speech is treated no differently than non-commercial speech. 334  I fall
decidedly on the side of those who lament the erosion of the commercial
speech doctrine.
Not only is the Court eroding the commercial speech doctrine, its
decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health "turned that doctrine on its head. 335
The Court has turned the commercial speech doctrine on its head
because the doctrine was intended to protect the interests of listeners,
not the interests of the commercial speakers. Sorrell focused on
protecting the interests of commercial actors.
In Sorrell, a state law limited the collection, use, and sale of a
physician's prescribing history by pharmaceutical companies and
"detailers, ' '336 unless the physician opted-in. The Court referred to
multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical companies and detailers as
"disfavored" speakers because others, such as researchers, could use the
same data without having to receive the physician's consent. The Court
described the content regulated by the statute as "disfavored" because
the statute sought to limit pharmaceutical marketing speech, or more
precisely the data accessible to detailers and pharmaceutical companies.
For these reasons, the Court determined that "heightened scrutiny" was
332. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 250, at 49 ("We cannot avoid the
visual clutter of billboards, or the promotional tie-ins to movies or other entertainment in stores,
restaurants, and the culture at-large.").
333. Id. at 223 ("the rhetoric in those cases suggests that increased protection for commercial
speech is almost inevitable."); Bernstein & Lee, Where the Consumer is the Commodity, supra note 2, at
51 ("the outcome of [Sorrell] left many questioning the continued viability of the commercial speech
doctrine"); Purdy, Roberts Court v. America, supra note 223, at 50 (noting the Court's "growing
protection for business's commercial speech"); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New Ground. A
Response to the Supreme Court's Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 389, 398 (2012).
334. E.g., Kozinksi & Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, supra note 253; Adam
Thierer, Advertising, Commercial Speech, and First Amendment Parity, 5 CHARLESTON L. REv. 503
(2011); Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 554 (noting that the petitioners in the case before the Court, as
well as parties in prior cases have advocated for replacing Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny with
a strict scrutiny test).
335. Piety, The Incoherence of Sorrell, supra note 238, at 6; Bernstein & Lee, Where the
Consumer is the Commodity, supra note 2, at 53.
336. "Detailers" is defined supra, at note 200.
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required, as opposed to the intermediate scrutiny that commercial speech
regulation typically receives.337 Justice Breyer dissented from the
application of heightened scrutiny because the law had only indirect and
incidental burdens on speech that was "entirely commercial. 338 Several
points flow from the Sorrell Court's analysis.
First, using categories of "disfavored" speakers and "disfavored"
content as the basis for constitutional protections and standard of review
determinations is doctrinally weak. Taken to its logical end, most laws
affecting speech would violate the First Amendment because most laws
could be characterized as disfavoring content or speakers. But, many
laws survive First Amendment scrutiny even though they disfavor
speakers and/or content. Defamation law, obscenity law, and the
Espionage Act disfavor content, to name a just a few examples, but they
are constitutional limitations on speech Testimonial privileges, such as
attorney-client and doctor-patient, disfavor speakers, but they are
constitutional limitations on speech. Thus, labeling content or speakers
as "disfavored" does not provide much of a basis, if any, to determine
whether a speech restriction violates the First Amendment or a higher
standard of review is necessitated.
Moreover, several Roberts' Court decisions disfavor content and/or
speakers. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court held that a government
employee does not have First Amendment rights in speech that relates to
his job duties.339  This law disfavors a class of speakers (government
employees) and content (speech that relates to their job duties as public
servants). In Morse v. Frederick, the Court held that a school could
punish a student that engages in speech that could reasonably be viewed
as advocating illegal drug use. 340 The Morse holding disfavors speakers
(students) and content (speech that could reasonably be viewed as
advocating illegal drug use).34 ' In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
the Court disfavored speakers that sought to communicate with groups
337. The Court gives short-shrift to the intermediate scrutiny analysis required by Central Hudson
by offering little more than the conclusory assertion that "the outcome is the same whether a special
commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form ofjudicial scrutiny is applied." Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668-
72.
338. Sorrell 131 S. Ct. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
339. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
340. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
341. The sign Joseph Frederick unfurled across the street from his school as the Olympic Torch
Relay Parade passed by read, "Bong Hits for Jesus." The majority acknowledged that the message was
"cryptic" but was able to glean this as a message advocating the use of illegal drugs. Id. at 401. In
concurrence, Justice Alito sought to emphasize the outer limits of the holding by stating that it would
not apply to speech that questioned the policy of the war on drugs or the benefits of medicinal cannabis.
Id. at 422 (Alito, J., conurring). Based on Alito's concurrence and the express language of the holding,
presumably a student that unfurled a banner reading, "Legalize Pot. Then, Do Bong Hits for Jesus,"
would receive First Amendment protection.
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designated as terrorist organizations, even if the content involved
information regarding how to legally operate through international legal
regimes.342 In McBurney v. Young, the Court held that a state law
prohibiting non-Virginia citizens from making use of Virginia's freedom
of information act did not violate the First Amendment. 343  This is a
clear case of the Court upholding a state law that disfavors a group of
speakers-non-Virginians.
In addition to the doctrinal flimsiness of "disfavored" speakers and
content as a basis for First Amendment determinations, the Court's
application of these categories to describe pharmaceutical corporations
would be "risible," if it were not so disheartening. 344 The Court applied
these categories in Citizens United as well. 345  Ironically, the Court's
use of "disfavored" speakers as a classification with First Amendment
significance originated in civil-rights era case law.346 These speakers
were deemed worthy of First Amendment protection because of the
struggles they faced in having a voice in the democratic process.
Applying the "disfavored speaker" concept to multi-billion dollar for-
profit companies seeking physicians' prescribing histories to boost sales
tarnishes the historical context of "disfavored" speakers in Supreme
Court jurisprudence and defies reality.347 In terms of having the ability
to voice a message, pharmaceutical companies are far from disfavored
or disadvantaged. One need only watch a few minutes of television
before an advertisement for some drug will appear.
Another questionable aspect of Sorrell is the Court's statement that
the Vermont law prevents detailers and pharmaceutical companies from
342. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
343. McBurneyv. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013).
344. See PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 250, at 50 ("To cast [major
commercial advertisers] as 'disadvantaged' or lacking an adequate opportunity for a 'voice' is risible.");
see also, Western Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney General of State, 271 P.3d 1, 19 (2011) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) ("the notion that corporations are disadvantaged in the political realm is unbelievable."),
rev'd, American Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490 (2012).
345. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
346. See also, Piety, The Incoherence of Sorrell, supra note 238, at 5 & n. 17, 15, 26-28, 54
(2012).
347. A similar sentiment was expressed by the dissenting Montana Supreme Court Justice in a
case analyzing the impact of Citizens United on a Montana state campaign finance law:
[I]t defies reality to suggest that millions of dollars in slick television and Interet ads-put out
by entities whose purpose and expertise, in the first place, is to persuade people to buy what's
being sold-carry the same weight as the fliers of citizen candidates and the letters to the editor
of John and Mary Public. It is utter nonsense to think that ordinary citizens or candidates can
spend enough to place their experience, wisdom, and views before the voters and keep pace with
the virtually unlimited spending capability of corporations to place corporate views before the
electorate.
Western Trade Partnership, 271 P.3d at 34-35 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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communicating with physicians in an "effective and informative
manner." 348 There is no constitutional right to communicate in the most
effective manner.349
Although the Court has eroded the ability of the commercial speech
doctrine to uphold regulations of commercial speech, it has not been
eviscerated. Justice Thomas believes that Central Hudson should not
apply when government regulation seeks to keep the public "ignorant in
order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace." 350 An opt-in
regime does not seek keep the public ignorant to manipulate their
market experience. To the contrary, it seeks to facilitate the disclosure
of information by commercial actors regarding their data processing
practices so that individuals may make informed choices about whether
to consent to data processing. Thus, a common objection by those
seeking to limit the scope of the commercial speech doctrine is not
applicable to an opt-in requirement.
D. Erosion and Inversion of Other First Amendment Law
The Court's erosion of the commercial speech doctrine is not unique
and is the result of a decades-long movement to use the First
Amendment as source of law to protect economic interests. 351  The
Court is using the First Amendment as a sword to strike down other
regulations intended to serve the public interest, such as in Citizens
United where the Court held that a limitation on campaign finance
regulations violated the First Amendment rights of corporations and
unions.352 Also, the Court's inversion of the commercial doctrine is not
the only example of the Roberts' Court turning an established. First
Amendment rationale on its head. The rationale for indecency
regulation is another example.
348. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
349. See, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) ("[W]e have
never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice.").
350. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
351. See generally, Edwards, The Corporate "Free Speech " Racket, supra note 296; and, Wu,
The Right to Evade Regulation, supra note 233.
352. E.g., Linda Greenhouse, Harvard Commencement 2013 ("1 watch with alarm as an activist
Court invokes its rigidly formalistic version of the First Amendment not as shield against government
suppression of speech but as a regulatory sword." (written copy:
http://harvardmagazine.com/sites/default/files/PBK-oration-Greenhouse.pdf) (video:
http://www.youtube.com/watchv-VwOipR9TVZY); Purdy, Roberts Court v. America, supra note 223;
Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation, supra note 233 ; but see, Rich Samp, In Attack on Commercial
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In 1978, the Court upheld the constitutionality of indecency
regulation on broadcast radio and television, even though indecent
content generally receives First Amendment protection.353 The dual
rationale of the Court was that broadcast radio and television were
uniquely pervasive in society and uniquely accessible to children.
354
Thirty-one years later, indecency regulation was before the Court
again.355 Although the Court did not decide the First Amendment issue,
it did offer brief dicta on the continuing viability of the dual rationale for
allowing regulation of indecent content on broadcast radio and
television. "The Commission could reasonably conclude that the
pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public
entertainment in other media such as cable, justify more stringent
regulation of broadcast programs so as to give conscientious parents a
relatively safe haven for their children."356 In other words, the Court
turned the rationale of Pacifica on its head by making the pervasiveness
of other media platforms in society a reason to allow indecency rules to
regulate broadcast radio and television even though they are no longer
uniquely accessible and pervasive media platforms in the twenty-first
century.
In addition to turning rationales upside down, the Court has also
turned them backwards. Campaign finance regulation provides an
example. Although much has been said and written about Citizens
United v. Federal Elections Commission,357 the maj or damage to
campaign finance regulation was already done by Federal Elections
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), three years prior.358
Citizens United was the proverbial nail in the coffin. Prior to the 2002
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), one could escape the
classification of "electioneering communication" by avoiding magic
words, like "vote for" or "vote against." This avoidance was easily
accomplished because one could make an ad seemingly focused on an
issue, but clearly implying or associating a candidate with that issue.
One purpose of BCRA was to avoid this circumvention of the
electioneering law by prohibiting not only the express advocacy for or
353. Federal Commc'n Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
354. Id. 748-49.
355. Federal Commc'n Comm'n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) ("Fox I").
The Court reheard this case in 2012. 567 U.S. -, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012). In both instances, the Court
did not address the First Amendment issue. In 2009, it held that the FCC did not violate the
Administrative Procedures Acts by reversing its decades-long policy and declaring that "fleeting
expletives" could now be considered indecent. In 2012, the Court held that the rule change violated the
due process rights of the respondents because of lack of notice of the change.
356. Fox 1, 556 U.S. at 529-30.
357. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
358. Federal Elections Comm'n Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) ("WRTL").
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against a candidate, but also the functional equivalent of express
advocacy. In WRTL, the Court essentially reinstituted the magic words
test and thereby removed the teeth of the law.359 The Court held that an
ad was not subject to regulation as an "electioneering communication" if
it had at least one reasonable interpretation other than express advocacy
for or against a candidate. This rationale turned the law backwards.
Not only did the WRTL holding turn the law backwards, it raised
questions about the Roberts' Court consistency in how it treats speakers
and content. The WRTL Court stated, "Where the First Amendment is
involved, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor., 360 But, the same
day that the Court issued WRTL, it issued Morse v. Frederick where the
tie did not go to the speaker, even though the message had more than
one reasonable interpretation. In WRTL, even if an ad could reasonably
be interpreted as express advocacy or its functional equivalent, it was
not considered an "electioneering communication" so long as it had at
least one other reasonable meaning. In Morse, so long as one reasonable
interpretation of a speech was the advocacy of illegal drug use, then it
did not matter if the speech had other reasonable, permissible
interpretations. The speech could be prohibited without violating the
First Amendment. In Morse, the tie went to the censor.
One could reasonably distinguish WRTL and Morse by noting that
one involved student speech and the other did not. That distinction,
however reasonable, is not the only defensible interpretation of the
Roberts Court's approach to free speech rights. Erwin Chemerinsky
observed that the Roberts' Court is "Not a Free Speech Court."
36
'
Despite the Roberts Court's invocation of the related concepts that
"more speech, not less, is the governing rule" 362 and that the real
solution to harmful speech is more speech,363 several decisions evince a
lack of commitment to these principles. 364  While acknowledging that
359. VRTL, 551 U.S. at 531 (Souter, J., dissenting).
360. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 474.
361. Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARiz L. REV. 723 (2011); see also, Fisk &
Chemerinsky, Unequal Treatment?, infra note 373, (noting the Court's disparate treatment between
union and corporate speech in the context of campaign finance regulation, as well as the limited speech
rights afforded to government employees versus the robust protection provided to a non-member of
public-sector union).
362. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361.
363. See, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012).
364. In illustrating that the Roberts Court is not a free speech court, Chemerinsky cites several
cases that result in less speech. Garcetti v. Ceballos results in less government employee speech because
the Court held that a government employee does not have First Amendment rights when speaking in his
official capacity. Id. at 726. Morse v. Frederick results in less speech because it prohibits speech that
could reasonably be interpreted as advocating illegal drug use, even if it could be reasonably interpreted
as conveying something else, including a "silly and incoherent" message. Id. at 728. Beard v. Banks
results in less speech because it allows prisons to withhold from some prisioners access to all
newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Id. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project results in less
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the Roberts' Court is not wholly opposed to free speech rights,
Chemerinsky concluded that an analysis of several free speech cases
"reflects the conservative majority's hostility to campaign finance
regulations, rather than a pro-speech commitment." 365  Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky engaged a related question: is the Roberts Court "Not a Free
Press Court?, 3 6 6  Her answer was equivocal, although ultimately a
gloomy one for those who value the role of the Fourth Estate in our
constitutional structure.36 7 Finally, a recent empirical study analyzing
decisions from 1946 through 2011 found that the current Court has been
the most favorable to business during that time period.368
In conclusion, a faithful application of the Central Hudson test should
result in a finding that at opt-in regime is constitutionally permissible
under the First Amendment. The government has substantial interests in
protecting the privacy of individuals, preventing overreaching of data
processors, and avoiding the commodification of natural persons. The
commercial speech doctrine and its rationale favor expanding consumer
choice, not in restricting it. An opt-in regime directly and materially
advances each of these interests because it ensures that online
commercial actors cannot process data without first receiving
affirmative, express, and informed consent. Finally, an opt-in regime is
narrowly tailored to serves these interests. An opt-out regime in which
individuals are unaware of how their personal data is used and traded in
online markets is insufficient because it is not as effective as an opt-in
regime in advancing these state interests.369
Although a faithful application of the Central Hudson test should
result in finding an opt-in requirement constitutionally permissible, the
Court's erosion and inversion of the commercial speech doctrine suggest
speech because it prohibits communication with entities designated as "foreign terrorist organizations,"
even if the speech provides guidance on how to use international law to peacefully resolve disputes. Id.
at 728-29. Another case that counters the notion that the Roberts Court is a free speech court is
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010). In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that the
Proposition 8 bench trial could not be transmitted to five other federal courts via a closed-circuit feed.
The Court based its decision on a purported procedural flaw by the district court in amending its local
rules. Justice Breyer's dissent notes that the Court rarely, if ever, intervenes in matters of administration
of lower court procedures. Id. at 203, (Breyer, J., dissenting).
365. Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, supra note 361, at 724.
366. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1819 (2012).
367. Lidsky stated that the Roberts Court is a free press court in the sense that it protects
unpopular speech, limits medium-specific distinctions for First Amendment purposes, and broadly
defines speech of public concern. Id. at 1821. But, the Roberts Court is not a free press court in that it
"appears to see the 'Fourth Estate' as little more than a self-serving slogan bandied about by media
corporations." Id. In light of this conclusion, Lidsky takes solace in the paucity of free press cases
adjudicated by the Roberts Court. Id.
368. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013).
369. See generally, Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, supra note 44.
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that a current majority of the Court may not uphold legislation imposing
an opt-in requirement. More likely, the Roberts Court will continue to
expand protection for commercial speech.370 There is, however, another
First Amendment analysis that may sustain an opt-in regime as
constitutionally permissible, perhaps even constitutionally required.
This analysis flows from an analogy regarding the First Amendment
rights of non-members of public-sector unions.
E. A First Amendment Opt-In Requirement
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided two cases involving
an opt-in requirement, Davenport v. Washington Education
Association371 and Knox v. Service Employees International Union.
372
Both cases involve fees charged to non-members of public-sector labor
unions and include First Amendment analysis. 373  Davenport involves
analysis of state legislation that imposed an opt-in requirement. Knox
did not involve any legislation that imposed an opt-in requirement.
Nonetheless, the Knox Court held that an opt-in approach was required
as a matter of constitutional law, even though this specific issue was not
briefed or argued by the parties.374 These cases provide some guidance
as to how the Court might analyze a claim that an opt-in requirement
prior to data processing violates a data processor's First Amendment
rights. Specifically, these cases may be helpful in establishing that
legislation requiring an online commercial data processor to receive an
individual's opt-in consent prior to data processing would be at least
constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment.
370. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 250, at 223 ("[T]he rhetoric in
[IMS Health and Citizens United] suggests that increased protection for commercial speech is almost
inevitable.").
371. 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
372. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
373. At the time of writing this Article, a third case involving the First Amendment rights of non-
members of public-sector unions was pending before the Court, Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir.
2011), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013). In Harris, the Seventh Circuit held that it does not violate
the First Amendment rights of non-members of public-sector unions when a state statute requires that
they pay fees to "support legitimate, non-ideological, union activities germane to collective-bargaining
representation." Id. at 693-94, 697. "In colloquial terms, the petitioners in Harris seek to have the
Supreme Court declare that, as a matter of the First Amendment, all government employment must be
on a 'right-to-work' basis." Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Unequal Treatment? The Speech
and Association Rights of Employees: Implications of Knox and Harris, Am. Cons. Soc'y Issue Br.
(Feb. 2014) (citing Transcript or Oral Argument at 21, Harris v. Quinn, _ S. Ct. _ (2014) (No. 11-
681)). The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners holding that the First Amendment does not permit "a
State to compel personal care providers to subsidize speech on matters of public concern by a union that
they do not wish to join or support." Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
374. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2298 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2306 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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Government employees are not required to join a union. Even if a
government employee chooses to not join a union, many states allow the
union to collect a fair share fee, also known as an agency shop fee.
Because of First Amendment concerns that arise, at least in the public-
sector context, these fees cannot be used for "ideological purposes that
are not germane to the union's collective-bargaining duties."375 Money
spent on ideological purposes that are not germane to a union's
collective bargaining duties is non-chargeable to objecting non-member
employees.
In Teachers v. Hudson,376 the Court established procedures to ensure
that objecting non-members have the ability to effectuate this protection.
This has become known as the "Hudson notice" requirement. Upon
receiving a Hudson notice, a non-member employee has a set period of
time to opt-out of paying the non-chargeable portion of union fees.
Hudson did not hold, however, that the First Amendment requires
affirmative consent before using a non-member employee's fees for
non-chargeable expenses. 377 But, Hudson did not preclude an opt-in
approach either. The Court considered the constitutional permissibility
of an opt-in requirement in Davenport, which involved a Washington
state law.
Washington state passed legislation requiring a union to receive a
non-member employee's opt-in consent before using that non-member's
fees for non-chargeable purposes. This type of law is known as
"paycheck protection" legislation and other states have enacted similar
laws. 378 Washington's law requires that a labor organization not use fair
share fees to "influence an election or to operate a political committee,
unless affirmatively authorized by the individual.' ' 79 After being sued
by a non-member employee for violating this opt-in legislation, the
public school union claimed that the opt-in requirement violated the
union's First Amendment rights. In a divided en banc opinion, the
Washington Supreme Court agreed with the union, reasoning that
heightened scrutiny was required and not satisfied because the opt-in
law deviated from the balance between non-members' and the union's
First Amendment rights as established by United States Supreme Court
precedence. 380 The Court, however, disagreed.
375. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 181 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36
(1977)).
376. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
377. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 181.
378. Ciarra Torress-Spelliscy, Taking Opt-In Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU Could Mean
for Post-Citizens United Shareholder Rights, 74 MONT. L. REv. 101, n. 47 (2013) (collecting statutes).
379. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760 (2006).
380. State ex. Rel. Washington State Public Disclosure Comm'n v. Washington Ed. Assn.. 156
Wash.2d 543 (2006) (en banc). In the past, the Court has recognized that the First Amendment rights of
2014]
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
In Davenport, the Court held that Washington's legislatively imposed
opt-in requirement was constitutionally permissible. 381 The Court
expressly limited the scope of its decision to the "unique context" of
public sector-unions. 382 In dicta, the Court noted that application of an
opt-in law in the private-sector union context "presents a somewhat
different constitutional question" because the fees are collected through
"contractually required action taken by private employers rather than by
government agencies. ' '383 The Court tempered its dicta by noting that it
was "not suggest[ing] that the answer must be different. '384  While
Davenport held that legislation imposing an opt-in requirement in the
public-sector union context was constitutionally permissible, Knox went
much further.
385
Knox arose under California law, which does not have an opt-in law
(aka "paycheck protection" legislation) similar to the Washington law in
Davenport. Sometime after a public-sector union issued its annual
Hudson notice, it imposed a temporary special assessment on
employees, including non-members, to fight a ballot measure seeking to
establish paycheck protection legislation in California. Non-members
filed a class action against the union alleging it violated their First
Amendment rights by imposing the special assessment without
providing a new Hudson notice and opportunity to opt-out.
The Knox Court held that not only must a public-sector union provide
a new Hudson notice before imposing a special assessment or dues
increase, the First Amendment requires the union to receive a non-
member's affirmative consent before exacting funds from that
employee. 386 In dissent, Justice Breyer described the Court's holding as
"mandat[ing] an 'opt-in' system in respect to the payment of special
unions must be balanced with the First Amendment rights of non-members. E.g., International Ass'n of
Machinists v. S.B. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). "The Court's focus on protecting the speech rights of
the union, however, vanished in subsequent cases." Fisk & Chemerinsky, Unequal Treatment?, supra
note 373, at 3.
381. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 191.
382. Id. at 190.
383. Id.
384. Id.. at 190, n. 4.
385. One commentator noted that "[t]he Knox holding represents a titanic shift by placing
corporate managers and union leaders in decidedly divergent legal positions." Torres-Spelliscy, Taking
Opt-In Rights Seriously, supra note 378, at 104-05. Torres-Spelliscy explains that Citizens United
allows corporations to ignore dissenting shareholders views in making political expenditures whereas
Knox prevents unions from making similar expenditures without receiving affirmative consent from
non-member employees and that this divergence is problematic as matter of basic equity and fairness.
See generally, id.; see also, Fisk and Chemerinsky, Unequal Treatment, supra note 373, at 10 ("The
[Citizens United] Court was untroubled by the fact that spending from general corporate revenues meant
that the corporation was spending the shareholders' money on political activities without their consent
and even against their political views.").
386. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296.
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assessments. ' '387  In separate opinions, both Justices Sotomayor and
Breyer expressed concern that the majority's constitutionally required
opt-in holding decided a constitutional issue that neither party briefed or
argued.388
While Davenport and Knox involve First Amendment analysis of an
opt-in requirement in the context of the relationship between a non-
member employee and a public-sector union, there are lessons from
these cases that apply in the context of a relationship between an
individual and an online commercial data processor. First, the Knox
Court reasoned that an opt-in approach was constitutionally required
because defaults should represent the probable preferences of most
individuals affected.389 Several studies show that the preference of most
consumers is that they not be subject to online behavioral advertising.39 °
One critique of these studies is that the actions of individuals do not
align with their responses in the studies and, therefore, this means that
the studies are flawed. Individuals are willing to trade their privacy for
the benefits of online data processing, such as free email, social
networking, and useful search engines. In other words, individuals
"pay" for these services with their data and the concomitant loss of
privacy.
Strandburg, however, make a persuasive argument that this market
perspective is flawed. Individuals do not know the prices they are
paying for these services because the costs are intentionally hidden from
individuals by the firms that process the data391 and because not all costs
are known at the point of purchase. Indeed, some costs occur after the
transaction when the data is used for new purposes, including purposes
that could not be known at the point of purchase because they did not
exist at that time. In a data processing world, both costs to individuals
and the economic value to data processors are intentionally hidden,
387. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 2298 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
389. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290.
390. E.g., Joseph Turow, et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising & Three Activities that
Enable It, Sept. 29, 2009, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1478214; Aleecia
McDonald and Lorrie F. Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users' Understanding of Behavioral
Advertising (TPRC 2010 Aug 2010), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 989092##.
391. Strandburg identified three types of information that individuals lack access to, but need to
make an informed decision regarding whether to allow data processing: (1) types of harms, prevalence
of those harms, and their costs; (2) the firm's collection, storage, and use practices; and (3) how the
recently collected information is connected with previously collected data available to the firm and how
the recently collected information may be disclosed to integrated companies or third-parties.
Strandburg, Free Fall, supra note 24, at 44-45. Others have made substantially similar points. E.g.
TUROW, DAILY YOU, supra note 4, at 8 ("Part of the reason for the lack of action may be that neither
citizens nor politicians recognize how deeply embedded in American live these privacy-breaching and
social-profiling activities are.").
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leaving consumers ignorant. Quite simply, without adequate
information, the market does not function in reality as the theory
requires. Thus, an opt-in requirement in the online data processing
context is at least constitutionally permissible, because as in Knox, such
a requirement represents the probable preference of most individuals.
Second, Davenport and Knox both involve a state actor. The
Davenport Court expressly limited its holding to the "unique context" of
an employee working for the government.392 It is possible that the Court
could distinguish these cases from legislation mandating an opt-in
requirement between an individual and a private data processor. But,
Davenport dicta noted that it was not suggesting that the answer must be
different in the context of a non-member employee and a private-sector
union. Moreover, Knox provides reasoning that suggests the public-
private dichotomy is not controlling in analyzing the constitutionality of
a law requiring opt-in consent.
The Knox Court stated: "The general rule-individuals should not be
compelled to subsidize private groups or private speech-should
prevail., 393  In reference to this statement, Ciarra Torres-Spelliscy
wrote: "Another way of framing this is the Supreme Court hereby
privileged the autonomy of the individual over the autonomy of the
labor organization to speak (or not speak) politically., 394  In other
words, the Court found that the interest of the individual employee took
preference over the interest of the union. Following this logic, an opt-in
approach is at least constitutionally permissible in the data processing
context because the interest of the individual should take precedence
over the interest data processors. The general rule should prevail:
Individuals should not be compelled to subsidize the private speech of
for-profit commercial actors by allowing unconsented data processing.
The Knox Court also stated that "[c]ourts 'do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' ' 395  At least some
privacy rights are fundamental.396 Whether informational privacy is a
fundamental right is not established, but in a recent case involving
legislation regulating data access, the Court described privacy as a
concept that is "integral to the person" and "essential to freedom." 397
392. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 190.
393. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295.
394. Torres-Spelliscy, Taking Opt-In Rights Seriously, supra note 378, at 114.
395. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (quoting College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post Secondary
Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)).
396. See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
397. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672. The full sentence in Sorrell is: "Privacy is a concept too integral
to the person and a right too essential to freedom to allow its manipulation to support just those ideas the
government prefers." Id. A legislatively imposed opt-in requirement would not be the government
manipulating the concept of privacy to support ideas it prefers. Rather, it would be the government
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Thus, the absence of a state actor should not preclude reliance on the
opt-in analysis in Knox and Davenport when analyzing an opt-in
requirement in the online commercial data processing context because
the privacy rights and interests of individuals are at risk, interests that
are integral to the person and essential to freedom.
Third, the Knox Court noted that closer legal analysis of opt-in versus
opt-out regimes is overdue. 98 It stated that very little attention has been
paid to this design choice and that most decisions regarding opt-in
versus opt-out are the result of historical accident, rather than reasoned
analysis.399  Online data processing by commercial actors is an area
where closer legal analysis of opt-in versus opt-out regimes is warranted
because of the lack of choice individuals currently have in being subject
to data processing and the growing ubiquity of the data processing
industry that affects individuals' lives and society.4 °°
Fourth, the Knox Court noted that the opt-out approach was a
"remarkable boon" for unions.40 1 The opt-out approach (if there is any
option at all) has been a remarkable boon for commercial data
processors because individuals have little information and little, if any,
choice when it comes to making an informed decision about allowing a
private company to process their data. Relatedly, the Davernport Court
described the Washington's legislatively imposed opt-in requirement as
a "modest limitation" on an "extraordinary benefit. ' '40 2 Requiring online
seeking to allow individuals to make informed choices about what data they share with online
commercial data processors. As the next paragraph above shows, the probable preference of most
individuals is to have a choice in what data they share and how it is used.
398. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290.
399. Id.
400. A closer analysis. of opt-in versus opt-out regimes is warranted in contexts outside of the
First Amendment as well, including the Fifth Amendment. Although the Court did not use the phrase
"opt-in," that term aptly describes the Court's requirement that one must expressly invoke the right to
silence before the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies. Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S.
-, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013). Leaving aside the irony that one must affirmatively invoke the right to
remain silent, Salinas provides persuasive authority for the constitutionality of an opt-in regime in the
context of online data processing by commercial actors. The right against self-incrimination is
expressly set forth in the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. ("No person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself..."). Yet, the Court decided that one
must expressly invoke this right before he can be afforded its protections.
If one must opt-in before the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies, then it seems
eminently reasonable to find an opt-in requirement at least constitutionally permissible in the context of
online commercial data processing. The right against self-incrimination protects the liberty interests
threatened by a criminal conviction, including physical imprisonment. The right to be free from
unwanted data processing is surely a lesser interest, but a liberty interest nonetheless. If a constitutional
right that protects against infringements of physical liberty requires an opt-in process, an opt-in
requirement protecting against infringements by online commercial data processors should comfortably
fall within the scope of constitutionally permissible opt-in requirements.
401. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290.
402. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 2378.
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commercial data processors to receive an individual's opt-in consent
prior to data processing is a modest limitation on the extraordinary
financial and informational benefits that these actors receive from the
aggregation of data.
If an opt-in approach is constitutionally required when a public-sector
union seeks to impose a special assessment or a dues increase upon a
non-member employee, an opt-in approach is at least constitutionally
permissible in the context of online, for-profit data processing, if not
constitutionally required.4 °3
VI. CONCLUSION
The preface to a popular Contracts Law casebook states: "No study of
law is adequate if it loses sight of the fact that law operates first and last,
for, upon, and through individual human beings. 4  Both private
corporations and public government are instrumental legal fictions
designed to serve humankind, these entities are not ends in
themselves. 40 5 Unfortunately, the law has lost sight of the interests of
individual human beings in the online data processing context because
there has been an overemphasis on the rights and freedoms of data
processors and an undervaluing of the rights and freedoms of
individuals.40 6 This overemphasis flows from the economic interests of
commercial actors and the Court's increasing willingness to substitute
its judgment for that of legislative bodies.
In the commercial speech context, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Virginia Pharmacy alluded to Lochner v. New York407 in warning that
the majority's use of the First Amendment was reminiscent of the
discarded jurisprudence where the Court invoked the Due Process clause
to override the social and economic judgments of legislative bodies. 40 8
In his Central Hudson dissent, Rehnquist expressly stated the Court has
403. This Article focuses on the more modest inquiry regarding the constitutional permissibility of
an opt-in regime before online commercial actors engage in data processing, as opposed to the bolder
claim that an opt-in regime is constitutionally required. Knox opens the door to the latter proposition,
but that analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
404. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT
LAW: CASES & MATERIALS xxiii (7th ed. 2012) (emphasis in original).
405. C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech
Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2004).
406. See, Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 6, at 1423. ("[D]ata privacy discourse has been
driven by concerns for the autonomy of those who would objectify individuals-with the rights of the
data processor as owner, trader, vendor, speaker, chooser. If we are serious about fostering individual
freedom in reality as well as in rhetoric, this is an odd result.").
407. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
408. Virginia Pharmacy, 424 U.S. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
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"return[ed] to the bygone era of Lochner" by striking down economic
regulations under the guise of free speech protected by First
Amendment.40 9  Thirty-five years after Virginia Pharmacy, Justice
Breyer's Sorrell dissent echoed Justice Rehnquist's concern by noting
that the Sorrell majority "reawakens Lochner's pre-New Deal threat of
substituting judicial for democratic decision-making where ordinary
economic regulation is at issue. ''410 Commentators also note the
Lochner-esque nature of the Court's recent First Amendment
jurisprudence.41' Should Congress pass legislation requiring online
commercial actors to receive an individual's opt-in consent prior to data
processing, First Amendment challenges will follow. Despite the
Court's "First Amendment Lochnerism,' '4 12 the privacy interests of
individuals should not be forgotten, nor subordinated to the economic
interests of artificial entities in the emerging and quickly expanding age
of Big Data.
An opt-in requirement will help refocus the law on individual privacy
interests, including the freedom from being commodified without
consent. To the extent that data is speech subject to First Amendment
protection, legislation imposing an opt-in requirement prior to data
processing by commercial actors should be found constitutionally
permissible under a faithful application of the commercial speech
doctrine. Alternatively, the constitutionally required opt-in procedure
that the Court imposed on public-sector unions in Knox v. SEIU should
be extended to individuals in the online privacy context, at least finding
that a legislatively imposed opt-in requirement is constitutionally
permissible. An opt-in requirement does not solve all of the privacy
concerns raised by online data processing. But, an opt-in requirement is
an important part of the solution to the new privacy challenges arising in
the Big Data era because it helps us regain sight that law operates first
and last, for, upon, and through individual human beings.
409. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 589-91.
410. Sorrell, 131 S.Ct at 2685 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
411. E..g., Edwards, The Corporate "Free Speech" Racket, supra note 296; and Purdy, The
Roberts Court v. America, supra note 223, at 47. See also, Jed Rubenfield, The First Amendment's
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 771 (2001) (comparing Lochner and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968)).
412. The Northern Kentucky Law Review published a symposium issue with various perspectives
on what "First Amendment Lochnerism" means. See generally, 33 N. KY. L. REv. 365 (2006).
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